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Kaufman: Judicial Correctness Meets Constitutional Correctness: Section 2C

JUDICIAL CORRECTNESS MEETS
CONSTITUTIONAL CORRECTNESS:
SECTION 2C OF THE CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Andrew L. Kaufman*
"A judge shall not hold membership in any organizationthat practices
invidious discriminationon the basis of race, sex, religion or national
origin.

Some form of this provision of Section 2C of the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct is the law in thirty-nine states, the District of
Columbia, and in the federal courts (except the Supreme Court).2

[Following the conference for which this article was prepared, the
American Bar Association's Joint Commission to Evaluate the Code of
Judicial Conduct began to circulate preliminary drafts of changes. In
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I would like to take this opportunity to thank my
colleagues on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics
and on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Committee on the Code of Judicial Conduct for
the education they gave me on matters of judicial ethics and for the good times we enjoyed together
in our work. In particular, I acknowledge the close reading and hard questions put to me by Judge
James McHugh of the Massachusetts Appeals Court who was chair of the Advisory Committee on
Judicial Ethics during the last part of my service on that Committee. I would also like to thank my
research assistant, Danielle Gray, J.D., 2003, for her valuable assistance on this project. Melinda
Eakin, my assistant, did her usual spectacular editing of endless drafts of this manuscript.
1. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C (2003). The ABA originally addressed
this subject by adding to the Commentary to Section 2 of the 1972 version of the Code of Judicial
Conduct language stating that "[iut is inappropriate" for judges to be members of such organizations.
LISA MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 15 (1992) (quoting MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C cmt. (1984)).
2.

See CYNTHIA GRAY, ORGANIZATIONS THAT PRACTICE INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION 14-

16 (1999) (a very helpful article, comparing and contrasting the versions of Section 2C adopted by
the various jurisdictions). Anyone who has ever served on an advisory committee on judicial ethics
owes a debt of gratitude to Cynthia Gray, Director of the Center for Judicial Ethics of the American
Judicature Society, who has organized the materials of judicial ethics and provided insight into their
proper interpretation in a wide-ranging series of articles. The Code of Conduct for United States
Judges, adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States, is not applicable to Justices of the
United States Supreme Court. See infra text accompanying note 86.
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July 2004, it released its Preliminary Draft of a new Section 3.03 to
replace Section 2C.3 This Preliminary Draft provision and its
Commentary are substantively identical to Section 2C and its
Commentary insofar as the matters discussed in this article are
concerned, except that they add the categories of ethnicity and sexual
orientation to the lists of prohibited discriminations. My hope is that if
the drafters do not address the problems with its formulation that are
pointed out in this article in their final recommended Rule, this article
will be of assistance to the various state and federal groups that will
recommend and finally decide whether to adopt the ABA's version of
the prohibition. It is the thesis of this article that it has been easier to
decide that codes governing judicial conduct should express an antidiscrimination principle than it has been to formulate the words that will
target the forbidden conduct sufficiently precisely, that will justify each
prohibition, and that will then withstand a constitutional attack based on
First Amendment principles. The result of the effort to do so to date has
been language that may prohibit less than it promises and more than it
should, or, in the language of constitutional law, that is both
underinclusive and overinclusive and may, in some of its applications,
fall victim to the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the First
Amendment.
After setting forth the difficulties with Section 2C as presently
worded, this paper considers five alternatives. Of the five, my preference
would be to repeal Section 2C entirely, leaving its work to be done by a
combination of laws of general applicability, the law of disqualification,
the electoral and appointive process, and social pressure. If that solution
is politically unpalatable, then I suggest four other possibilities, all of
which in my view are preferable to the current Section 2C.
INTRODUCTION

In the 1960s the United States Supreme Court, for the first time,
began to look at the applicability of the First Amendment to state
regulation of the legal profession and the practice of law. In a series of
cases beginning with United States v. Button,4 the Court held
unconstitutional efforts of states to forbid civil rights organizations from
soliciting plaintiffs to institute litigation and to inhibit unions from
3. The text may be viewed
071904.pdf.
4. 371 U.S. 415,428 (1973).

athttp://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/redline-canon3

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss4/13

-

2

Kaufman: Judicial Correctness Meets Constitutional Correctness: Section 2C

2004]

JUDICIAL CORRECTNESS

offering plans of group legal services.5 The Court then considered the
effect of the First Amendment on the general professional rules
regulating advertising and the solicitation of legal business. For some
time, the professional rules had reflected a view that law practice was
more than a business. It was a profession, and lawyers should not seek
clients by claims that were sensational, extravagant, misleading, or
deceptive. That view came into conflict not only with a different
conception of law practice and consumer rights but also with an
expansion of First Amendment concerns in the days of the Warren
Court. The result was that a closely divided Supreme Court first held
that state suppression of legal advertising was unconstitutional, and then
held unconstitutional many, but not all, forms of state regulation of mail
and print solicitation of business by lawyers.6
With the Supreme Court having interested itself in the
constitutional impact of the First Amendment on state rules governing
the legal profession, it was perhaps inevitable that the Court would
become interested in the constitutional impact of the First Amendment
on rules governing the judiciary, in particular the Codes of Judicial
Conduct. Finally, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a provision of
Minnesota's Code of Judicial Conduct and held unconstitutional its
prohibition on candidates for elected judicial office from announcing
their views on issues that might come before them.7 The decision in
White raises the question of what other provisions of the state codes of
judicial conduct might raise constitutional questions.
Prime candidates for review, in my view, are the provisions in
various codes forbidding judges from belonging to a variety of
organizations that engage in certain named kinds of discrimination. The
current provisions raise a host of issues that need to be resolved long
before one reaches any constitutional questions. Many of those issues
relate to the very meaning of the recommended Section 2C of the
American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which
provides the starting point for the jurisdictions that have enacted

5. See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); U.M.W. v. 111.State Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
6. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438;
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); and Shapero v. Ky. State Bar
Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 479. But see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978); Fla.
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995).
7. 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
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membership provisions in their judicial codes. Others are normative
issues relating to the substance of that provision.
I.

THE CATEGORIES OF INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION
A.

Section 2C and State Variations

A majority of the states that have chosen to forbid judges from
participating in organizations practicing invidious discrimination have
done so by adopting substantially the text of the ABA's model Section
2C, although greater variance exists with respect to the states' treatment
of the ABA's commentary (e.g., several states have altered or eliminated
the last paragraph dealing with a judge's duty to resign). 8 California,
Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Vermont have increased the
scope of the prohibition to include discrimination based on sexual
orientation. 9 In doing so, California and Massachusetts exempted from
the prohibition membership in any official military organization. 10 New
York and Oregon have added to the prohibition the categories of age,
disability, and marital status."1 Rhode Island included disability.12
Many states have taken a somewhat more restrictive approach:
Colorado, Iowa, Oregon, and Texas prohibit membership based on a
judge's "knowledge" of the discriminatory practice, and Maine,
Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Washington have
replaced "invidious" discrimination with language that effectively equals
"unlawful" discrimination. 3 The latter formulation restricts the
prohibition to legislatively determined prohibitions, such as those
limited to places of public accommodation. Finally, many states have
8.

See generally GRAY, supra note 2 (presenting a summary of state code provisions and

ethics decisions dealing with both the professional and the constitutional issues).
9. See CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Section 2C (2004); MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Section 2C (2004); N.Y. STANDARDS & ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES § 100.2(D) (Consol.
2004); OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 1-101(H) (2002); VT. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Section 2C (2004).
10. See CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Section 2 (2004); MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Section 2C (2004).
11. See N.Y. STANDARDS & ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES § 100.2(D) (Consol. 2004); OR.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 1-101 (2002).
..
12. See R.I. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C (2004).
13. See COLO. RULES OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE Section 2B (2003); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL

CONDUCT Section 2C (2003); TEX, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C (2002); ME. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C (2003); MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C (2003);

N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C (2003); OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 1-101(H)
(2002); WASH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C (2003).
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attempted to provide more guidance than the ABA's commentary on
what constitutes invidious discrimination. Those states have done so
either by listing factors to use in assessing whether discrimination has
occurred (or whether the organization in question is truly private) 4 or
have defined invidious discrimination as that which tends to stigmatize
excluded members as inferior. 15 Those that have taken the latter
approach have not gone further to explain how to recognize a
stigmatizing effect and whose view of the effect is critical.
In considering the impact of Section 2C on the lives of judges, it is
important to recognize the unique legislative and judicial situation in
which judges subject to the prohibitions of Codes of Judicial Conduct
find themselves. The Codes of Judicial Conduct are designed to
"establish standards for ethical conduct of judges."' 6 Like the codes of
professional conduct governing lawyers' conduct, they have their
genesis in the recommendations of committees of the American Bar
Association.' 7 Whatever expertise the ABA may claim with respect to
the lawyers' code seems considerably less with respect to codes of
judicial conduct, but the ABA has stepped into the legislative drafting
void there as well.18 The state and federal judiciaries acting in their
legislative capacities to govern the conduct of judges have, with some
changes, accepted the ABA's product as their governing codes. Indeed,
insofar as the governance of judicial conduct is concerned, the judiciary
acts in a combined legislative-executive-judicial role.
Once a jurisdiction has adopted a code, however, substantial
ambiguity in critical provisions may present a serious problem. Lack of
clarity in the rules that govern society, intentional or not, is a fact of life.
The need for interpretation, whether by courts, administrative bodies,
other government officials, or the public itself, is a necessary part of
living in society. The Code of Judicial Conduct, however, presents a
special case. Ambiguities in that Code get resolved in a most

14. See CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Section 2 (2004); MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Section 2C (2004); N.Y. STANDARDS & ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES § 100.2(D) (Consol.
2004); OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT l-101(H) (2002).
15. See, e.g., MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C cmt. (2004).
16. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble (1990).
17. See Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, American Bar
Association, About the Commission: Background Paper, available at http://www.A.B.A.net.org/
scripts/printview.jsp?Ref-http://www.A.B.A.net.orgjudicialethics/
about/background/html
(last
visited May 13, 2004).
18. 1 have expressed myself on this subject elsewhere. See Kaufman, Ethics 2000: Some
Heretical Thoughts, THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 1, 4-6 (2001 Symposium Issue).
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unsatisfactory fashion. There are three sources of interpretation. Judges
may interpret the rules themselves, they may turn to advisory
committees, which have been appointed by the courts in more than forty
states to assist judges,1 9 or they may discover the meaning via the
judicial discipline process. The first source is not helpful if the judge is
in doubt; judges know that interpretation when one has a personal
interest in the result is not to be relied on. The second source is useful
but one-dimensional. The advice-giving bodies, comprised largely or
entirely of judges, are committees that operate informally without the
intellectual benefit that comes from adversary presentation.20 They must
generate their own ideas and solutions in the time their members can
spare from their regular duties. Moreover, they do not conduct hearings
to assess the facts with respect to particular inquiries. They rely on
information submitted by the inquiring judge. Thus, it is even
theoretically possible that a committee could (not that it ever would)
issue contradictory advice under Section 2C about the same organization
because different facts were submitted by different inquiring judges.
Committees often avoid the issue entirely by stating general principles
and then refusing to advise about particular organizations because they
are not equipped to engage in fact-finding. 21 The third source may be
helpful to judges generally but not to the judge who is the subject of a
disciplinary hearing for having engaged in particular conduct.
The subject matter of codes of judicial conduct is only rarely an
issue in regular litigation-once in a while in a disqualification motion
made to the particular judge, perhaps, but even there the number of times
such decisions are reviewed is small. And so what we are discussing
with respect to codes of judicial conduct is a body of clandestine law, of
interest largely to judges themselves, and those who have an academic,
or sometimes a media, interest in the particular issues. But the subject is
very important for individual judges because occasionally the issues do
become very public and are hotly debated. If the codes of conduct are
badly drafted and unclear, judges are left to act alone or to advise
without much assistance and without the possible clarification that may

19. See Cynthia Gray, Advisory Committees Let Judges Look Before They Leap, THE JUDGES'
J., Spring 2003, at 29.
20.

MASSACHUSETTS COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ETHICS, DESCRIPTION OF THE COMMITTEE,

available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/supremejudicialcourt/cje/comm
descrip.html (last visited May 13, 2004).
21.

See GRAY, supranote 2, at 1-2.
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come from judicial review. That may be a perilous situation. In my
opinion, Section 2C leaves judges in just such a situation.
II.

IMPARTIALITY

A first issue relates to the purpose of Section 2C. The purpose will
be relevant in the subsequent discussion of the constitutional issues
raised by the prohibition. In discussing the judicial ethics issues
regarding Section 2C, I am assuming that the constitutional discussion in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White with respect to what kind of
impartiality counts as a compelling interest is limited to the election
context and is not controlling, at least not yet, with respect to the
conduct of sitting judges in their judicial roles. But the purpose behind
the prohibition contained in Section 2C is important also in figuring out
just what is and what ought to be prohibited to judges in the first place.
The Commentary to Section 2C states that purpose quite succinctly:
"Membership of a judge in an organization that practices invidious
discrimination gives rise to perceptions that the judge's impartiality is
22
impaired.,
A moment's reflection, however, raises the question whether
impartiality, or at least impartiality by itself, is the only justification.
Membership of a judge in many organizations raises a question as to the
judge's impartiality. A judge may belong to a pro-choice or pro-life
organization, a pro-death penalty or an anti-death penalty organization.
Those memberships also raise questions of impartiality, as much or
perhaps even more than the issue dealt with in Section 2C, and yet there
is no categorical prohibition of membership in such organizations. Such
issues are dealt with under the requirements of Sections 2A and 4A(1)
that a judge "shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary" and that all
extrajudicial activities must be conducted in a manner that does not "cast
reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge. 23
Those prohibitions link the permissibility of the judge's activities off the
bench to the requirements of the judge's job on the bench. When those
prohibitions have been enforced by advising against membership in
particular organizations, it is because the organizations or the causes

22.
23.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C cmt. (2003).
Id. Sections 2A, 4A(1) (2003).
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they advocate are likely to turn up in matters that come before the
judge.24
Perhaps membership in an issue-related organization is thought to
raise different issues from membership in those organizations referred to
in Section 2C in the judicial ethics context as well as in the
constitutional context. Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White distinguished between
impartiality with respect to parties, which he viewed as a potential,
relevant basis for the restriction on judicial speech in that case, and
impartiality with respect to issues, which he thought did not.25 He stated
that a judge's lack of predisposition with respect to relevant legal issues
in a case "has never been thought a necessary component of equal
justice. '26 Of course there is a difference between "predisposition" and
giving vent to public expression of "predisposition" by speaking about
issues or by joining issue-oriented organizations. It has become apparent
that many of the Justices who are creating new First Amendment law in
this area feel much freer than their predecessors of fifty and more years
ago to lecture publicly about issues more or less closely related to those
27
that may come before their Court.
But despite Justice Scalia's use of the word "never," he was talking
about a restriction on judicial speech in the context of a judicial election,
where speech about issues was very important, and not in the context of
appropriate conduct for a sitting judge. I cannot believe that Justice
Scalia--or at least that the Court-would conclude it was
unconstitutional for a code of judicial conduct to forbid, for example, a
judge from expressing a point of view about a case that was set for
argument the next week, or more to the point of Section 2C, for a judge
sitting on criminal cases to belong to the local police-sponsored anti24.

See,

e.g.,

Comm.

on

Codes

of Conduct,

Advisory

Op.

40,

available at

http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/40.html (1998) (interpreting Section 5B(l) of the Code of
Conduct for U.S. Judges, and advising that if the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the
Sierra Club, and the NAACP "are likely to be engaged in proceedings that will ordinarily come
before them or will be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court," the judge should
not be an officer, director, or member); Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op. 82, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/40.html (1998)

(advising more generally that "if

the judge

believes that his or her personal, direct advocacy of the policy positions advanced by the
organization might reasonably be seen as impairing the judge's capacity to decide impartially any
issue that may come before the judge, and the affiliation may reasonably be seen as indirect
advocacy of those policy positions, the judge should not be a member of the organization").
25.

See White, 536 U.S. at 777.

26. Id.
27.

See id. at 779.
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crime club.28 In that context, one might consider that judicial speech
about impending legal issues or the organizational associations of a
judge could be subject to at least some restriction. Indeed, Justice Scalia
recently recused himself without comment from voting on the petition
for certiorari in a case in which a "suggestion for recusal" had been
made because the Justice had given a speech in which he expressed his
views about the lower court's decision.29
Moreover, Justice Scalia in White agreed that sometimes partiality
with respect to issues results in partiality with respect to parties.3 ° In the
unlikely event that the Court were to extend its comments about
impartiality regarding issues of law to hold that such concern does not
justify restrictions on judicial membership in an issue organization, it
should be noted that at least some of the current Section 2C membership
restrictions relate more to issues than to persons. To the extent that lack
of impartiality justifies prohibiting judicial membership in organizations
that discriminate on the basis of gender, for example, the justification
would not be so much fear that a male judge belonging to such an
organization is likely to be biased against a woman as such-most male
judges have all kinds of respectful interactions with women-but rather
fear that such a male judge might lack impartiality with respect to the
kind of gender issue likely to end up in litigation. Thus, with respect to
at least some of the Section 2C prohibitions, Justice Scalia's notions
about impartiality would cast doubt upon using lack of impartiality as a
justification at all.
It is also possible that administratively there is a difference between
questions of lack of impartiality on an issue and lack of impartiality
toward a person. If there is a problem of impartiality with respect to
issues it may be more easily handled administratively by recusal or
disqualification in individual cases. The fact that there is a particular
issue involved in a case will usually be apparent. This is not necessarily
so with respect to the identity of an individual. It may be difficult to
identify, ex ante, those cases where the membership of a judge may be
28. Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in White, reserved the question of permissible
restrictions upon judges "because they are judges-for example, as part of a code of judicial
conduct .. " Id. at 796. In August 2003, the American Bar Association amended its Model Code
of Judicial Conduct by adding a section requiring disqualification if "the judge, while a judge or a
candidate for judicial office, has made a public statement that commits, or appears to commit, the
judge with respect to (i) an issue in the proceeding; or (ii) the controversy in the proceeding." Canon
3E(l)(f).
29. See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
30. See White, 536 U.S. at 776.
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relevant. If a judge belonged to a club that did not admit Catholics,
would a motion for disqualification be granted in every case in which a
Catholic was a party? Or only where being a Catholic was relevant to the
issues in the case? Would it make a difference if one of the lawyers, but
not a party, were Catholic? How would a judge know these facts in
advance? Suppose the judge found out in the middle of the case?
Perhaps issues like these provide some justification for a prophylactic
provision like Section 2C so as to prevent difficult recusal or
disqualification issues from arising in individual cases.
On the other hand, one might say if that is a justification for Section
2C, then that Section sweeps the issue under the rug for a judge who
would have otherwise joined the discriminating club. Parties will not
learn about the judge's proclivities, and so Section 2C may preserve the
appearance of impartiality in some cases by hiding an actuality of
partiality.
Moreover, there is a disconnect between the stated purpose of
Section 2C and the rules relating to disqualification of judges. Section
2C, insofar as it is based on considerations of impartiality, assumes that
it is reasonable for litigants and the general public to believe that judges
have a tendency to subscribe to the views of organizations to which they
belong. The law of disqualification, however, generally rejects that
assumption and seems not to care that litigants or the general public
might disagree. Many cases have held that mere membership in an
organization may not justify disqualification of a judge on the basis of
bias simply because the organization has staked out a position with
respect to an issue. 3 1 Many Catholic judges, for example, sit in abortion
cases, indeed even when they have strong personal views on the
immorality of abortion. 32 It is not much of a distinction to say that
Section 2C is focused on bias based on a personal characteristic of the
individual litigant whereas the abortion example deals with an issue.
When the issue is granting permission to a minor to have an abortion in
the absence of parental consent, what is at stake is the moral decision of
the litigant, her personal identity as it were. Yet the law of
disqualification trusts the ability of the judges to put aside any strong
personal views they may have and apply the applicable legal rules. And
so we are still left to puzzle out why the lack of impartiality justification
31. See Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 649, 659-60 (10th Cir. 2002), and numerous
cases cited therein.
32. See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Center v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Noonan, J.).
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is thought to serve as a satisfactory justification for the sweeping
prohibitions contained in Section 2C.
There must be other considerations here that the Commentary does
not single out. It is important for us to try to understand what they might
be because, as we shall see later, impartiality as a justification for state
restriction of at least some First Amendment activity of judges has been
weakened by the Supreme Court's decision in White.33
Possibly, the prohibition is the product of a utilitarian instinct:
judges are icons in a system that trumpets neutrality as a core value.
Participation of judges in certain discriminatory activity, therefore, has
the potential to undermine that value and public confidence in the
judiciary, whether or not the judge sits on a case involving that type of
discrimination. But of course the same considerations exist in the case of
issue conflict.
Another possible justification is a factual distinction between
potential bias because of the identity of a person and potential bias
arising from an issue in a case. Perhaps the prohibition contained in
Section 2C derives from an unexpressed notion that the former type of
discrimination presents a greater danger to the administration of justice
or to the public perception of the administration of justice than the latter
type. It is a perception that is not assuaged by the fact that the legislature
may not constitutionally force the organization to cease its
discriminatory practices and may not constitutionally prohibit the
ordinary citizen from joining the organization.
The judgment may well be that the potential threat posed by
membership in a group that practices the prohibited invidious
discrimination is not sufficiently curable by disqualifying the judge in
cases where such membership is relevant. And why is that? Perhaps
instinctively the drafters and supporters of Section 2C have made the
judgment that a judge's membership in an organization that practices
invidious discrimination indicates a bias that poses a danger to the
judicial process itself because the organization to which the judge
belongs is doing something that is morally wrong even if it is
constitutionally protected. That would certainly be a much more
compelling justification for barring a membership that would be
constitutionally protected for the ordinary citizen than potential lack of
impartiality, should a relevant case ever arise.

33.

See White, 536 U.S. at 788.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 13

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1293

Such a justification for Section 2C presupposes a serious judgment
by a court acting in a legislative capacity not only about the necessity for
the prohibition but also about the moral conclusion being reached. It also
speaks to the desirability of being quite clear about exactly what it is that
is being prohibited and why. I have already suggested that the ABA's
recommendation is lacking in setting forth all the reasons constituting
the "why." I will now suggest that it is also quite ambiguous with
respect to the "what," and that ambiguity makes it difficult to craft a
satisfactory explanation of the "why."

III.

SECTION 2C-THE CONSTITUTIONAL LINK

The biggest definitional problem derives from the terminology of
"invidious discrimination. 34 The term was described by the ABA
committee that recommended it as "not an unfamiliar one to judges for
they have interpreted and applied it in literally hundreds of cases. 3 5 The
term, however, has been taken from constitutional law where the issue is
usually discrimination by the government and "invidious" seems
synonymous with "unconstitutional," i.e., it is the type of discrimination
that violates the Equal Protection Clause. Even in Griffin, the term was
used to indicate the kind of animus that had to be shown to give a
constitutional interpretation to a statute that founded a federal cause of
action on private conduct depriving individuals of constitutional rights.36
The concept runs into difficulty, however, when applied to purely
private discrimination by organizations because it runs up against
notions of our personal right to associate with whom we will, whether
expressed as an ordinary right of human beings or as a right protected by
a state or federal constitution. The typical public accommodations
statute, addressed to private conduct, is worded in terms of
' 37
"discrimination," not "invidious discrimination."
The Commentary to Section 2C addresses the meaning of
"invidious discrimination":
34. See generally Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases,
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1992) (presenting a thoughtful
analysis of the complex relation between morality and discrimination in ordinary private relations).
35. ABA Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility, Report No. 120, at 5 (August
1984) (citing as examples Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Griffin v. Breckinridge, 403
U.S. 88 (1971); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)).
36. See Griffn,403 U.S. at 102.
37. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2004). For a list of state statutes, see Joseph Singer, No
Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1478-90
(1996).
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Whether an organization practices invidious discrimination is often a
complex question to which judges should be sensitive. The answer
cannot be determined from mere examination of an organization's
current membership rolls but rather depends on how the organization
selects members and other relevant factors, such as that the
organization is dedicated to the preservation of religious, ethnic or
cultural values of legitimate common interest to its members, or that it
is in fact and effect an intimate, purely private organization whose
membership limitations could not be constitutionally prohibited.
Absent such factors, an organization is generally said to discriminate
invidiously if it arbitrarily excludes from membership on the basis of
race, religion, sex or national origin persons who would otherwise be
admitted to membership. See New York State Club Ass 'n, Inc. v. City
of New York, [487 U.S. 1] (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary
Internationalv. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).38

Those few words raise many questions of interpretation and
application, all relating to the general problem of when an organization
practices invidious discrimination. Perhaps the first to be faced is
whether the reference in the Commentary to organizations whose
membership limitations could not be constitutionally prohibited means
that the concept of "invidious discrimination" incorporates a notion of
lack of constitutional protection, or whether constitutional protection is a
separate inquiry to be reached only after concluding that an organization
practices invidious discrimination.
The Commentary's language seems to indicate that the former
interpretation is correct. How else would one explain the Commentary's
effort to exclude from the prohibition membership in an organization
that "is in fact and effect an intimate, purely private organization whose
membership limitations could not be constitutionally prohibited"? Not
all private, intimate organizations are excluded. Only those whose
membership limitations could not be constitutionally prohibited are
excluded. In the explanation of the Commentary, such organizations are
not practicing "invidious discrimination."
If the Commentary correctly concludes that discrimination by small
organizations whose membership limitations may not be constitutionally
prohibited does not constitute "invidious discrimination," it seems
difficult to conclude that similar discrimination by large organizations
whose membership limitations also may not be constitutionally
38. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C cmt. (2003).
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prohibited is "invidious." As Boy Scouts of America v. Dale indicates,
the membership limitations of many organizations, small and large, even
including hate organizations like the Ku Klux Klan, are constitutionally
protected. 39 That is not to say that the Code could not have been drafted
to prohibit judges from membership in organizations that discriminate,
whether invidiously in the constitutional sense or not. Many provisions
in state judicial codes restrict the exercise of the constitutional rights of
judges. But Section 2C does not do that. Its prohibition is tied to the
exercise of invidious discrimination by the organization, and invidious
discrimination seems tied to the constitutional protection afforded to the
organization's membership limitations. That conclusion strongly
suggests that the text of Section 2C should be interpreted as precluding a
finding of "invidious discrimination" with respect to all organizations
practicing discrimination
if their membership policies are
constitutionally protected.
Such a conclusion was indeed reached by the Massachusetts
Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics in its Opinion 2002-11.40 Based
on the factual description of the Masons provided by the inquiring judge,
the Committee advised that a judge's membership and acceptance of a
leadership role in the Masons, which limits its membership to men,
would not violate Section 2C because the discrimination was not
"invidious. '4 1 The Massachusetts Opinion relied on two factors
concerning the Masons. First, as described by the inquirer, the Masons
"seek to promote cultural values of legitimate interest to its members"
and "do not seek to stigmatize any excluded group., 42 Second, relying
on the reference to constitutional principles in the American Bar
Association's commentary to Section 2C, the Committee viewed the
discriminatory conduct as beyond the state's regulatory power. It relied
on Donaldson v. Farrakhan,which held that the state could not penalize
the exclusion of women from a meeting of Muslim men:
To be afforded First Amendment protection, there is no requirement
that an association exist for the particular purpose of disseminating a
39. 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000).
40. See Mass. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 2002-11 (2002) [hereinafter Op. 200211].

41. See id. Accord Committee on Codes of Conduct, Judicial Conference of the United States,
U.S. Compendium of Selected Opinions, § 2.14(b) (1995). I should note that I was a member of the
Massachusetts Advisory Committee and took part in some of the discussions of this issue, including
an earlier Opinion, 2002-3, which declined to answer the question. However, my term on the
committee expired before the decision in Opinion 2002-11 was reached.
42. Id.
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specific message. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655

(2000). It must merely engage in expressive activity that would be
impaired by the unwanted inclusion. Id. Here the mosque's men's class
was engaging in its religious meeting for men only, expressing concern
for the community, and discussing the moral ideology and roles of men
in addressing crime and violence in the community. The expression of
religious viewpoints specific to men of the faith would have been
impaired by the inclusion of women in the meeting. The admittance of
male members of the public to an otherwise nonpublic mosque
meeting does not bring the event within the scope of the Massachusetts
public accommodation law. Holding otherwise would impermissibly
burden the defendants' freedom of association
under the First
43
Amendment. Boy Scouts v. Dale, supra at 659.
The Committee, in applying this reasoning to the issue of
membership in the Masons, added: "And, although it is not immediately
apparent how admission of women would adversely affect the Masons'
ability to achieve their expressive goals, the State simply has no business
telling the organization how it should do so." 44 Once the Committee
concluded that the discrimination practiced by the Masons was not
"invidious," then it followed that Section 2C did not prohibit a judge's
membership.45
I hope that other jurisdictions will find a way to ignore the language
in the Commentary about the protected constitutional rights of the
organizations because its logic would gut the provision completely. The
membership limitations of a Ku Klux Klan cell are constitutionally
protected, and the Commentary's logic therefore suggests that Section
2C does not prevent a judge from joining such a cell, whether small or
large. If Section 2C means anything, it must mean that membership in
such an organization is prohibited. Perhaps one can avoid the
Massachusetts Committee's interpretation of Section 2C by saying that
since such an interpretation would defeat the apparent purpose of the
provision, the Commentary's language exempting intimate, private
organizations should be ignored, on the plausible argument that it has no
foundation in the text and indeed is contrary to it. The text should be
read as written, leaving it to individual judges to raise constitutional
objections to Section 2C as applied to membership in particular
43. 436 Mass. 94 (2002).
44. Op. 2002-11, supranote 40.
45. See id.
The Committee went on to suggest, but not to decide, that membership might be
forbidden by Section 2A, which provides that a "judge should.., conduct himself at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Id.
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organizations, a subject that we shall consider later. That interpretation is
certainly easiest in jurisdictions that have not adopted the Commentary.
A better way out of this problem is for states that have adopted
Section 2C to eliminate the Commentary's language exempting certain
described private, intimate organizations. If such organizations are to be
exempted, the exemption should be contained in the text, but without the
language relating to constitutional protection.4 6 The reason for
exempting a small exclusionary men's or women's reading or cardplaying group is that the social discrimination, albeit invidious, is de
minimis and not because its membership selection process is
constitutionally protected. Presumably the exemption exists because of a
desire not to forbid judges from belonging to such informal gatherings as
a small reading, card-playing, or dinner group whose membership is
limited exclusively to men or to women. Perhaps there is also an
administrative component to the exemption because there is no reliable
means of telling whether the discrimination is in fact invidious as
opposed to the result of natural selection. The typical reading, cardplaying, or dining group does not have a mission statement or other
public declaration of its practices or admission standards. On the other
hand, an administrative justification is weak because the purposes of a
group are more discoverable when the membership is small. Asking a
few people will provide a fairly reliable answer.
IV.

INVIDIOUS V. NON-INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION

A.

Not So Safe Harbors andArbitrariness

There are further difficulties in defining "invidious discrimination"
aside from the linguistic link to constitutional law.4 7 The commentary
provided by the ABA attempts to be helpful, but when applied to
organizations other than out-and-out hate organizations, it is susceptible
to contrary reasonable conclusions.
46. That solution has been adopted by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in its recent
revision of its Code of Judicial Conduct, following the recommendations of its Committee to Study
the Code of Judicial Conduct. (I should disclose that I was a member of that committee.) See MASS.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C (2004).
47. The Commentary's reference to examination of an organization's current membership
rolls is somewhat blind. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C cmt. (2003). What is
intended is some notion that mere absence of minority members night not be conclusive of
invidiousness in the local historical society of a rural town with no minority population while it
probably would indicate invidious discrimination in a historical society of a major city.
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The Commentary, already quoted, provides two safe harbors and a
residual category. A judge desiring to join an organization would like to
avoid the residual test of arbitrary exclusion by finding one or more of
the permitted factors whose presence presumably makes the
discrimination non-invidious. The first safe harbor consists of
organizations "dedicated to the preservation of the religious, ethnic or
cultural values of legitimate common interest to its members." Aside
from religious organizations themselves, the various ethnic or religiousbased anti-defamation leagues would presumably be an example of what
the drafters had in mind. Their purposes are self-protective of defined
groups.
The word "legitimate" is left undefined and requires us to answer
what an "illegitimate" purpose would be. The drafters have deliberately
avoided the word "unlawful" but they have also deliberately avoided
providing any examples. Suppose a Ku Klux Klan chapter defined its
objectives in religious, ethnic, and cultural terms-i.e., the organization
is dedicated to the preservation of what it called "White, Anglo-Saxon,
Protestant values," but adopted as its symbol the public burning of
crosses on land owned by one of its own members. Would that involve
the preservation of values of "illegitimate" common interest, even if
lawful? Suppose it expressed its views simply in ordinary speech?
Would such expression involve "illegitimate" common interest?
Suppose a pacifist religious organization, limited by race or ethnic
grouping, expressed its opposition to undertaking a war in Afghanistan
or Iraq by burning an American flag before every weekly service?
Perhaps the drafters meant to equate "legitimate" with some notion of a
consensus view of what is not "hateful" or "immoral," but in the absence
of any explanation or even any examples, it is difficult to know what
"legitimate common interest" means.
A more pressing example of the difficulty caused by the safe harbor
exemption exists in those jurisdictions that have expanded the forbidden
areas of discrimination to include the category of sexual orientation.49
Whatever our personal views on the subject, the status of discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation is legally different from race and
gender discrimination. Classification on the basis of race or gender has
been held to be sufficiently suspect to warrant strict or intermediate
48.

Id.

49. See William C. Duncan, "A Lawyer Class": Views on Marriage and "Sexual
Orientation" in the Legal Profession, 15 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 137, 148-49 (noting that thirty-two
states refer to "sexual orientation" in their judicial conduct codes).
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scrutiny. 50 Although the Supreme Court of the United States has
overruled its earlier holding that it was not unconstitutional for states to
prosecute homosexual conduct, it did so for privacy reasons using
rational-basis review. 51 More relevantly to Section 2C, the Supreme
Court held in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale that a state may not make it
unlawful for the Boy Scouts of America to refuse membership to
homosexuals. 5 2 Whether we agree or disagree with the reasoning used in
Lawrence and with the holding in Dale, they demonstrate that the legal
status of discrimination on the basis of sexual identity is still viewed
differently from the other categories of prohibited membership, perhaps
even with respect to some areas of "public accommodation" where other
kinds of discrimination may lawfully be prohibited.
The prohibition in Section 2C goes well beyond activities in the
field of public accommodation. The controversy over the membership
policy of the Boy Scouts also indicates that many citizens hold different
views about sexual identity from those of homosexuals and want to be
able to associate with others who hold similar views. It is true that many
citizens made those same arguments about race two generations ago.
Our society has overwhelmingly rejected those views, and I think it is
accurate to say that it has reached a consensus-in the sense at least of
an overwhelmingly dominant view-that ordinarily membership in a
group that excludes on the basis of race is harmful to the purposes of our
society, and morally wrong. But it is doubtful that our society has yet
reached a consensus that membership in a group that wishes to promote
a heterosexual lifestyle is morally wrong. Prohibiting discrimination
against homosexuals is one thing. Suppressing dissent, at least by
judges, in the form of prohibiting membership in an organization that
wants to promote a heterosexual lifestyle, is another. There is a
difference between my saying that I won't join the Boy Scouts because
of their discriminatory policies and that I would forbid all judges from
doing so. The question for the judges deciding whether to expand
Section 2C is whether there is a dominant view on the subject in their
jurisdiction and if there is not, whether they wish to legislate on this

50. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (employing heightened
scrutiny for gender classifications); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (employing strict scrutiny for
race classifications).
51. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
52. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
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issue with respect to the private conduct of judges in the absence of such
a view concerning the morality of promoting a heterosexual lifestyle.
The constitutional protection of the membership policies of the Boy
Scouts is not conclusive of the power of the state to prohibit judges from
joining organizations that practice certain kinds of discrimination. On
the other hand, there is a difference between making the judgment that
resulted in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,53 in which the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found a violation of the state
constitution in denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and the
further judgment that judges should be forbidden from joining an
organization that promotes a heterosexual lifestyle. To accomplish the
latter requires the additional conclusion that such an organization
practices "invidious" discrimination. But the Supreme Court's position
may have some bearing on the notion of what constitutes "invidious"
discrimination. It is also possible that the Boy Scouts' membership
policies could pass muster as not constituting "invidious discrimination"
if understood in terms of "we have our values; they have theirs; we don't
address the question of whose values are better or who are better people;
we just want to promote our values." Indeed, the brief of the Boy Scouts
in Dale came close to asserting that position: "Official Scouting
materials addressed to the boys do not refer to homosexuality or inveigh
against homosexual conduct; rather they teach family-oriented values
and tolerance of all persons... Boy Scouting does not have an 'anti54
gay' policy, it has a morally straight policy.
But how are judges to tell whether that statement is conclusive in
the sense of determining the invidiousness of the policy? Must they
make a factual determination of the mental state of the Boy Scouts'
national or local policymaking group? That seems quite impossible. But
all that is left then is the public pronouncements and actions of the
affected organization and an estimate of the reasonable public perception
of the purposes and activities of the organization in question. Moreover,
it is possible that different local troops of the Boy Scouts apply the
national policy differently. Indeed, there is the further problem
occasioned by the fact that a number of Boy Scout troops have
apparently decided not to discriminate in their membership policies and

53.
54.

440 Mass. 309 (2003).
Petitioner's Brief at 2000 WL 228616, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)

(No. 99-699).
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quietly admit gay members in violation of national policy. 55 May a judge
be a scoutmaster in such a troop in the jurisdictions that have expanded
the coverage of Section 2C to include the category of sexual orientation?
There is no literal violation of Section 2C, but the public perception of
bias would still be the same, especially if the troop and the judge kept
quiet about its revised policies.56
The Commentary contains yet another safe harbor for judges.
Religious organizations, including I assume all kinds of groups
organized under the heading of "a religion," are exempt, we are told by
the Reporter for the ABA Committee that recommended Section 2C,
because "the categories of race, sex, religion and national origin are the
only ones that are constitutionally protected. 5 7 The result of the
exclusion is that a judge apparently may be a Boy Scout leader if the
troop is sponsored by a church, but not if it is sponsored by a secular
group-unless the secular group's discrimination is not regarded as
"invidious." But judges who want to join their children in Boy Scout
activities would be well advised, under the Commentary's explanation,
to have their children join the "almost 65 per cent of Boy Scout
troops... sponsored by churches or synagogues. ' 58 That seems to be an
odd result and quite defeating of the expressed purpose behind Section
2C.
The argument might be made that there is a difference between
church activities and church-sponsored activities. Indeed, in the
Establishment Clause context, the Supreme Court has occasionally
seemed to adopt such a notion, 59 even though many religious institutions
deny the difference. But whatever validity that argument has with

55. See, e.g., Gay Issue Embroils Boy Scouts After a Chapter's Policy Memo, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 1996, at A24.
56. The Massachusetts Advisory Committee that decided that the Masons did not practice
invidious discrimination may yet have to decide whether to apply the same reasoning to the Boy
Scouts. Previously, in the absence of sexual orientation as a prohibited category in its version of
Section 2C, it declined to find a prohibition against membership in the general language of Section
2A. See Op. 2002-11, supra note 40. NoW, however, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has
added that category to Section 2C. Although the Court has removed the constitutional link from the
language of Section 2C, the Advisory Committee would still have to decide whether the Boy
Scouts' membership policy was stigmatizing or simply promoting "cultural" values and also what it
wanted to do about the First Amendment issue. See MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C
(2004).
57. LISA MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 16 (1992).
58. Petitioner's Brief at 2000 WL 228616, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)
(No. 99-699).
59. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1972).
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respect to education in tying knots fades when the organization seeks to
further religious teachings and values on a particular subject.
There is the further problem that if we conclude that there are
sufficiently weighty reasons for prohibiting judges from joining such
organizations, why should a judge be permitted to join an organization
practicing invidious discrimination if it is sponsored by a religion? Why
is the effect on public perception of the ability of the judge to perform
his or her judicial duty fairly mitigated when the invidious
discrimination is practiced by a religious organization? Perhaps some
supporters of Section 2C believe that religious sponsorship removes the
discrimination from the category of "invidious" or perhaps it would be
fairer to characterize the argument as a belief that government ought not
to interfere with the way religious organizations wish to conduct their
activities. Although Bob Jones University v. United States involved
primarily a question of statutory construction, it suggested in the context
of provision of a government benefit that an exception for a racially
discriminatory religious organization is not compelled by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.6 ° In that case, the Supreme
Court of the United States was unanimous in holding that denial of tax
benefits to a private religious school that discriminated on the basis of
race did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
The government's compelling interest in wiping out racial
discrimination in education overrode whatever burden existed on the
exercise of religious beliefs.
More importantly, in a situation like membership in the Boy
Scouts, where no government benefit is involved, Employment Division
v. Smith tells us that the Free Exercise Clause is inapplicable to a neutral,
generally applicable law-which Section 2C without an exemption for
religion would appear to be. 6 1 It thus appears that the Free Exercise
Clause by itself does not compel the exception set forth in Section 2C.
Smith tells us that a constitutional weighing of the government interest
with a free exercise interest is appropriate only when a hybrid free
exercise of religion right is involved,62 that is, the free exercise interest is
combined with the assertion of another constitutional right-such as the
freedom of association or free speech rights that are relevant to the
application of Sections 2C and 2A to the permissibility of judicial
60. See461 U.S. 574, 595 (1983).
61. See 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). Smith was decided three months before the ABA adopted
Section 2C in its present mandatory form.
62. See id. at 881-82.
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membership in certain organizations. Those constitutional rights will be
discussed later in this paper.
The drafters of Section 2C do not have the justification for
exempting religious organizations that satisfied the Supreme Court when
faced with an equal protection challenge against New York's exemption
for "benevolent orders and religious corporations, 63 in its antidiscrimination law. In rejecting such a challenge in New York State Club
Association v. New York, the Court found justification in the city's
explanation that it had excluded benevolent and religious orders because
there was no testimony in the record that they were places of business
activity. 64 But the purpose of Section 2C is not to eliminate invidious
discrimination in places of public accommodation serving as places of
business activity. The stated purpose is to prohibit judges from joining
such organizations because of the symbolic effect of such membership
on the public perception of impartiality. 65 Excluding religious
organizations from the scope of the prohibition cannot reasonably be
justified on the basis of a lack of symbolic effect when judges belong to
religious organizations that are engaged in invidious discrimination.
Except for the First Amendment questions to be discussed later, the
biggest justification for the exception for religious organizations in
Section 2C may well be political. The decision to insert an antidiscrimination provision into codes of judicial conduct was an invitation
to all groups who believe that they have been subjected to discrimination
to seek inclusion among the protected groups. Inclusion signifies judicial
recognition that the group has in fact been the subject of discrimination,
with a consequential impact on the future substantive law of the
jurisdiction. The more groups that are included in Section 2C, the greater
the possibility of opposition from religious groups who would not want
their membership and their practices-for example, the separation of the
sexes in Orthodox Jewish synagogues or the exclusion of women from
the priesthood by the Catholic Church-brought under the microscope
of judicial disciplinary or ethics committees. But that does not change
the fact that these exceptions greatly weaken the force of Section 2C.
They even strike at its heart. A judge is not forbidden by the language of
Section 2C to join Matthew Hale's World Church of the Creator, even
though it qualifies as a core hate group.66
63.

N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. New York, 487 U.S. 1, 18 (1988).

64. See id.
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C cmt. (2003).
66. Hale was ordered to rename his organization because it infringed another organization's
65.
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Aside from the exceptions for religious organizations, there is the
safe harbor exception for an organization that "is in fact and effect an
intimate, purely private organization whose membership limitations
could not be constitutionally prohibited." I have already discussed the
desirability of eliminating the closing limiting phrase and recognizing
that the reason for that safe harbor is not that the organization's
membership criteria may be constitutionally protected but that allowing
discrimination, even if invidious, by a small social group is likely to
have both a de minimis and a safety valve effect.
If the "safe harbor" exceptions for membership do not apply, the
Commentary's test of invidiousness is whether the organization
"arbitrarily excludes from membership on the basis of race, religion, sex
or national origin persons who would otherwise be admitted to
membership." It is apparently not enough to conclude that persons are
excluded from membership on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national
origin because otherwise the word "arbitrarily" would not be necessary.
Presumably what is meant is that there is no good reason for the
discrimination. As we have seen, the meaning of those terms is not
obvious and in the context of a code of judicial conduct, the usual
methods of clarifying ambiguous terminology of the sort contained in
Section 2C are not available to judges seeking guidance.
B.

The "Practice"of Invidious Discrimination

This paper has noted previously that a problem with a prohibition
based on the practice of invidious discrimination that is grounded in a
policy of promoting impartiality and the appearance of impartiality
arises from the failure of Section 2C to address, at least explicitly, the
problem of impartiality arising from judges joining issue-oriented
organizations. That issue was raised in the context of ascertaining the
purpose of Section 2C, but actually the problems of lack of impartiality
based on membership in a Section 2C organization and lack of
impartiality based on membership in an issue organization are more
closely linked than the text of Section 2C recognizes. The prohibition
contained in Section 2C is aimed at "membership in any organization
that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion
or national origin." The key words in that definition are "practices
invidious discrimination."
trademark, but he refused to comply. See Hale v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 335 F.3d 678, 679
n.l (7th Cir. 2003).
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What constitutes the "practice" of invidious discrimination? The
obvious example is the membership policies of the organization, and
most cases and ethics opinions interpreting Section 2C have concerned
membership policies. It is easy to find a potential violation if an
organization chooses to exclude members of the mentioned categories.
Presumably it would also be easy to find a potential violation if an
organization refused to employ workers in the named categories. But
suppose an organization said that anyone may belong to our
organization, but one of our purposes is to advocate the repeal of laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of the named categories. Or
suppose a Ku Klux Klan chapter said, "We welcome AfricanAmericans, Catholics, and Jews who share our views about such
groups." If indeed it could be shown that some Jews, Catholics, or
African-Americans were members, would the chapter's advocacy of
discrimination constitute the practice of invidious discrimination? I
assume that the answer to that question would be yes, because a contrary
answer would afford a way for an organization to turn Section 2C into a
dead letter by simply moving its discriminatory practices out of its
membership policies and into the statement of its goals. Indeed, when
the issue involves membership in an organization, issue discrimination is
a proxy for discrimination on the basis of one of the categories set forth
in Section 2C.
Once one admits that the reach of Section 2C extends to the stated
goals of an organization as well as to its membership policies, many
other problems appear. If we assume for the moment that Section 2C
would be violated by organizations that were limited respectively to men
or women, then what would its reach be to, say, a women's bar
association, one of whose goals was to advance the interests of women
(as opposed to the interests of men) and specifically to urge appointment
of women to positions of power in legal organizations and in the
judiciary? 67 The organization would argue that it is open to all, to men as

67. The Women's Bar Association of Massachusetts website states that:
The Women's Bar Association of Massachusetts is where women lawyers in
Massachusetts come together to build important personal and professional relationships.
The WBA is about women helping women. When you join the WBA you can expect
leadership opportunities, rewarding work on our committees, a networking forum for
business development and more. At the WBA, our vision is to build a strong community
of women lawyers who make a difference in the profession and in society at large.
WOMEN'S BAR ASSOCIATION OF MASSACHUSETTS, ABOUT THE WBA, at
http://www.womensbar.org/WBA/AboutWBA.htm (last visited May 14, 2004). The officers and

members of the board of directors are all women. See WOMEN'S BAR ASSOCIATION OF
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well as women. But in fact the organization is open de facto only to
those men who favor the goals of the organization and if the goal of the
organization is to promote the roles of women, necessarily at the
expense of men, would that be a form of prohibited discrimination on
the basis of gender?
Such an argument would be met with an assertion that even if those
policies might be regarded as discriminatory, they are not "invidious"
because they are being urged only in order to achieve equality. Therefore
while membership in a men's bar association, open to all but urging
appointment of men to positions of power, would be prohibited as
involving membership in an organization practicing "invidious
discrimination," membership in a women's bar association would not
involve a violation. The argument is that in the context of the history of
the country, a men's bar association as described above would
stigmatize women even if open to women, while a women's bar
association open to men would not have a stigmatizing effect with
respect to men. The same argument may be made with respect to the
National Bar Association, which described itself as an organization of
"predominately African-American lawyers and judges" and as serving as
"an advocate for the Nation's African-American lawyers., 68 While that
argument has force when applied to discrimination in society at large, it
does not seem wise to interpret the ambiguous words of Section 2C so
as, for example, to prevent male judges from joining a male-oriented
organization while permitting female judges to join a female-oriented
organization. Judges are a relatively small and collegial group of elite
government officials with an institutional role in providing equal justice.
Making a distinction of this kind is bound to cause tension and harm
collegiality. In my view, the harm of treating male and female, straight
and gay, white and African-American judges differently in this regard is
greater than the gain.
The issue arises in many different contexts. Under a headline of
".Sisters' Get Their Turn to Bond," the Boston Globe recently reported
as follows:

MASSACHUSETrS, WBA OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 2003-2004, http://www.womensbar.org/WBA/

Officers.htm (last visited May 14, 2004).
68.

NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, THE NBA PERSPECTIVE, at http://www.nationalbar.org/

about/index.shtml (last visited May 14, 2004). See also Marcavage v. Bd. of Trs. of Temple Univ.,
No. 00-5362, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19397, at *8, *12 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2002) (opinion of
Tucker, J., refusing to recuse herself in a civil rights case on the basis of active membership and
receipt of an award from the local affiliate of the National Bar Association).
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For 125 years, the town fathers of [Manchester-By-The-Sea, with a
population of 5200] have gathered each July at a park overlooking the
harbor. Their group for older men, the Elder Brethren, is a Manchester
institution; their picnic, the one and only meeting of the year.
Chowder is always. served. And women are always excluded..
Between 80 and 120 men are expected at the July 5 meeting of the
Elder Brethren.... [A] handful of Manchester women, most in their
70s, started a new group for women only, the Elder Sisters, and
yesterday held their first annual chowder picnic for a69capacity crowd of
250, two weeks before the men's event is scheduled.
If one assumes that these are "organizations" and that they are
engaged in the "practice" of discrimination, is the discrimination
"invidious" in terms of Section 2C? For both? For neither? For the
men's organization but not the women's? My argument is that in the
context of telling judges what organizations they are prohibited from
joining, it would be a mistake to conclude that a male judge could not
join the Elder Brethren but that a female judge could join the Elder
Sisters.
To push the "practice" of discrimination issue one step further,
surely membership in an organization open to members of all races but
pushing a platform advocating the legalization of white-only clubs
would be widely regarded as violating Section 2C. But what about the
membership of judges in an organization open to all that advocated the
legalization and expansion of affirmative action based purely on race in
state-run entitlement programs even though no history of de jure
discrimination in the operation of that program existed? The argument
would be that while of course the organizations were entitled to free
speech, what was being urged was what had already been judicially
determined 7to
be constitutionally forbidden discrimination, and hence
0
"invidious.
One could avoid the difficulties posed by hypotheticals such as
these-and I am sure that readers will quickly think of many otherswith a narrow definition of the "practice of invidious discrimination."
Such a definition, however, would seem to afford a potential end-run
around the prohibitions of Section 2C.
69. Jenna Russell, 'Sisters' Get Their Turn to Bond, BOSTON GLOBE, June 22, 2003, at B 1.
70. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that a racebased classification within a government program failed strict scrutiny and therefore violated equal
protection); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (same).
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C. Some FurtherExamples
The discussion to date suggests that it is easier to write language
prohibiting membership in organizations that practice "invidious
discrimination" than to know what one has prohibited. One might say
that every regulation like Section 2C will have difficult problems of
interpretation at the edges. Section 2C, however, is likely to operate
largely, if not wholly, at the edges. Judges are not likely to want to join
the core hate groups that are clearly covered. Consider the following
organizations: 1) The Augusta National Golf Club; 2) the board of
trustees of a boys-only secondary school; 3) the board of trustees of a
girls-only secondary school; 4) the board of trustees of Smith or
Wellesley College; 5) The Junior League; 6) The Masons; 7) The Sons
of the Confederacy; and 8) any organization that claims it is not
discriminating because it has a handful of carefully selected Jews,
Catholics, African-Americans, Hispanics, etc.
There are a few "Men Only" golf clubs in this country. 71 The
Ladies' Golf Club of Toronto is an old "Women Only" golf club just
across the border in Canada.72 In their defense, members say such things
as: the club is neither business nor social; it is a collection of people who
like to play golf; those are the only facilities at the club; and we like to
hang around afterwards informally, sometimes in our underwear. It is a
place for men to talk guy talk-or for women to talk women talk. When
the Augusta National Golf Club does sponsor a public event, the Masters
Golf Tournament, it is open to men and women guests alike. I think
most advisory committees interpreting Section 2C would say that a golf
club does not fit within the "intimate, purely private" safe harbor. My
guess is that the drafters of the prohibition would say that the reasons
given for excluding women from membership are flimsy and
stigmatizing. I also think that some others might well say that social
havens for men and women are useful. The federal Committee on Codes
of Conduct has concluded that all-male social clubs and a female health
club with no business or commercial purpose or advantage were not
practicing "invidious discrimination. 7 3 It is entirely plausible that
different jurisdictions might resolve the issue with respect to all of these
organizations differently.

71.

See Marco R. della Cava, Men Tee up as Critics Tee off; Members Explain Why All-Male

Clubs Endure, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 4, 2002, at 1.
72. See id.
73. U.S. COMPENDIUM OF SELECTED OPINIONS, § 2.14(c) (1995).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 13

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1293

Membership on boards of directors of schools that segregate by
gender in secondary schools and colleges is an even more difficult
problem. There are three plausible interpretations of Section 2C in this
context. A judge may be a director of either an all-male or an all-female
school; a judge may be a director of neither; or a judge may be a director
of an all-female, but not an all-male, school. To the extent that
"invidious" discrimination has a connection to the idea of
unconstitutional discrimination, Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan is instructive. A challenge to state exclusion of men from the
School of Nursing of this all-women's institution was upheld because
the discrimination did not meet the test of being substantially related to
achievement of important government objectives. Nor was there any
showing that the all-woman School of Nursing represented
compensation for past discrimination or that it was necessary to achieve
some legitimate governmental objective.74 One ethics committee has
adapted the compensatory remedy test to gender discrimination by
private organizations in the following language:
[T]o satisfy the Hogan standards, the organization must demonstrate
that (1) there is a sex-based disadvantage suffered by its membership
related to its basis of classification; (2) the intention in forming or
continuing the organization is to compensate for this disadvantage;
(3) the organization's programs and policies are not based upon and do
not perpetuate archaic and stereotypical notions of the abilities or roles
of the sexes; and (4) it is the organization's single-sex policies and
programs that directly and substantially
help its members compensate
75
for the previous disadvantages.
The Committee adopted that test in the course of deciding that it did
not have enough information to decide whether a judge could be a
member of the Junior League of Tucson, a community service
organization whose membership was all female although its bylaws had
been amended to be gender neutral.76

74. See 458 U.S. 718, 727, 730 (1982).
75. Ariz. Sup. Ct. Jud. Ethics Advisory Comm., Advisory Opinion 94-13 (1994) (quoting
Chai R. Feldblum et. al., Legal Challenges to All-Female Organizations, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 171,219 (1986)).
76. See id. Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, in its Commentary

specifically names the Junior League as well as the Masons as permissible organizations for judges
to join as examples of the special exemption in its Section 2C for "fraternal" and "sororal"
organizations. FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C cmt. (2003).
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If one applies that test to same-sex girls schools, a school could
surely show that at one time in the history of this country, there was
discrimination against women in public education at both the secondary
and the college level and that private single-sex schools for girls and
women had been established in response.77 It would, however, be much
more difficult to demonstrate compliance with conditions three and four
today. However, the same Arizona committee indicated another possible
justification for single-sex activities in the context of a decision that the
discriminatory gender policies of the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts had
"some justification which, in the absence of any harm to excluded
persons, would permit a judge to participate in these organizations." The
Committee found "some justification" in "the debate among educators,
psychologists and social scientists whether educational, social or
psychological
benefits accrue to children from same-gender group
78
activity,

The committee did not consider the reasonableness of the reaction
of a child excluded on the grounds of his or her gender that the exclusion
was stigmatizing. Its reasoning could be used to support single-sex
schools, but a plausible argument could also be made that the
justification smacked of the stereotype and also had a stigmatizing
aspect. In such a situation, it seems easier to decide whether the
discrimination ought to be permitted as a matter of social, political, and
educational judgment rather than as a matter of the definition of the
word "invidious." In permitting judges to join the Boy Scouts and Girl
Scouts despite their gender policies, the Arizona committee implicitly
rejected the notion that invidious discrimination should be judged from
the perspective of the discriminated group, focusing instead on the
reasonable justification that could be advanced for the discrimination.
But if educational research has sufficiently demonstrated that (some)
boys and girls flourish better if educated separately, at least at certain
developmental stages, then a test that focused more on differences than
on discrimination could yield a different analysis for single-sex schools
than for single-sex communal or business organizations.
In similar fashion, Massachusetts Advisory Opinion 2002-11,
discussed earlier, concluded that membership in the Masons did not
violate Section 2C.79 It seems likely to me that other jurisdictions might
reach different conclusions with respect to judicial membership in the
77. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 536-37 (1996).
78. Ariz. Sup. Ct. Jud. Ethics Advisory Comm., Advisory Opinion 94-7 (1994).
79. See Op. 2002-11, supra note 40.
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Masons and possibly in the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts. The ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, which
recommended the original non-mandatory Section 2C, set forth its view
that the "perspective that is important is not that of judges, but the
litigants' and the publics' [sic], who see judges belonging to
organizations that they cannot join because they are considered
inferior., 80 As noted above, when one is dealing with a small, welldefined group of powerful government figures with the mission of equal
justice that judges have, it does not seem desirable to draw the line of
prohibited organizations between male-oriented and female-oriented
organizations. Where judges are concerned, and to the extent that
impartiality and the appearance of impartiality are goals, the impact of
drawing such a line does not seem neutral.
The issue of what counts as "invidious discrimination" is not easy
even in the case of racial discrimination. A current controversy
throughout the South involves the use of the Confederate flag as a
symbol, both by government organizations and by private organizations.
Many of the users justify use of the flag in terms of cultural heritage and
pride. Opponents characterize the flag as symbolic of the oppression and
crimes committed in the name of slavery. Whose view should prevail in
deciding whether Section 2C prohibits a judge from joining, say, the
Sons of the Confederacy, which uses the Confederate flag as a symbol
and is "open to all male descendants of any veteran who served
honorably in the Confederate armed forces"? 8' The answer to that
question would be crucial in applying the test used by the Massachusetts
Committee.
The last hypothetical raises the stakes considerably for judges. It is
one thing for a judge to be forced to make a decision when the
exclusionary policy is quite clear. It is another when an organization has
responded to legal requirements or public pressure or perception by
engaging in tokenism-admitting one or a handful of a formerly
excluded group. In deciding whether a change to gender neutrality in the
by-laws of the formerly gender-restrictive Junior League of Tucson
made its membership policies non-discriminatory, the Arizona Judicial
Ethics Advisory Committee in its Opinion 94-13 stated:

80. Report No 120, reprintedin 109 ABA Rep. 658, 662 (1984).
81. See SONS OF
CONFEDERATE
VETERANS,
Who Can
http://www.scv.org/membership/info.asp (last visited Aug. 16, 2004).
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The burden is on each judge to comply with the code, and thus the
burden is on each judge to investigate the group's membership
practices to determine the extent of the discrimination, if any. "Where
a club's by-laws or clear practices do not reveal the discriminatory
practice, but the judge has reason to suspect more subtle
discrimination, the judge has a duty to'' become
informed on the matter
2
and take appropriate action under 2C.

The Arizona committee is correct that tokenism should not be sufficient
to remove the label of "invidious discrimination," but the committee
nevertheless has greatly increased the burden on judges to pierce
the
83
organizations.
private
of
procedures
admissions
often Byzantine
D. Additional Difficulties with Section 2C
The previous Sections have identified a number of interpretive
problems: what is the relevance of constitutional protection to the
meaning of invidious discrimination; what makes discrimination
"invidious"; whose viewpoint on that issue is controlling; is
discrimination by a minority against a majority "invidious"; and what
constitutes the "practice" of invidious discrimination? I hope that I have
said enough to persuade that the answer to these questions is not obvious
from the text of Section 2C or its commentary. Policies beyond those
indicated in the words of the text and commentary will dictate the
answers.
The problem of interpreting Section 2C is rather more difficult than
an ordinary question of statutory interpretation. Such a matter involves
navigating the shoals of "intent" and the relevance of legislative history.
Interpretation of the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires
us to consider the relevance of the "intent" or purpose of the original
drafters, an ad hoc committee comprised mostly of private attorneys and
selected by the president of the American Bar Association-i.e., not
your typical law-giver. 84 The recommendations of that committee were
approved by the House of Delegates of the ABA-primarily private
attorneys selected by various bar groups-for recommendation to the
82. See Ariz. Sup. Ct. Jud. Ethics Advisory Comm., Advisory Opinion 94-13 (2004) (quoting
Indiana Adv. Op. 1-94).
83. See Borne v. Haverhill Golf & Country Club, 791 N.E.2d 903, 907-09 (Mass. App. Ct.
2003) (affirming a finding of discrimination against women by a golf club in the application of its
rules not only with respect to admission but also with respect to the use of its facilities).
84. See AMERICAN

BAR ASSOCIATION,

ABA POLICY AND

PROCEDURES HANDBOOK,

available at http://www.abanet.org.isu/greenbook/chapterl .html (1999-2000).
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various state and federal authorities with power to promulgate the
recommendations as rules. 85 After the Code was put forth by the ABA,
its recommendations were forwarded to state and federal authorities,
many of which made changes before adopting them, but many of which
did not. The process of adoption was different in each state, but often
there was a committee appointed by the relevant state judicial body that
considered the suitability of each rule for adoption in the relevant
jurisdiction. Sometimes the committee proposed altered or additional
commentary to accompany the rules. Finally, some judicial authority,
usually the highest court of the state, adopted the Code, but often not the
commentary, as a governing body of substantive law regulating judicial
conduct for its judges. For the federal judiciary, the adopting authority
was the Judicial Conference of the United States, and its action regulates
the conduct of all judges except Justices of the United States Supreme
6
8

Court.

This varied process of adoption muddles the process of
interpretation in any given jurisdiction. Whose intent, whose purpose,
whose legislative history is relevant, if those guides are thought
important by the interpreting body? Is uniformity an important goal?
Perhaps the ambiguities of Section 2C suggest that it is perfectly
appropriate for different jurisdictions to weigh the policy considerations
differently, given that more than one reasonable interpretation of the
Rule exists with respect to all or many of the questions being discussed
in this article.
E. Section 2A and Section 4A
The struggle for meaning does not end with the specific provisions
of Section 2C. The Codes of Judicial Conduct also have some relevant
general provisions. Section 2A provides that judges "shall act at all times
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary," 87 and Section 4A provides that judges shall
conduct all their extrajudicial activities "so that they do not: (1) cast

85.

See LISA MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 6 (1992).

86. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) (establishing the Judicial Conference of the United States and
granting it the authority to recommend rules that "promote... fairness in administration, [and] the
just determination of litigation" to the Supreme Court); CODE OF CONDUCT OF UNITED STATES
JUDGES, introductory cmt. (1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/chl.html
(indicating that all of the United States courts, except for the United States Supreme Court, must
comply with this code of conduct).
87. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2A (2003).
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88
reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge."
The Commentary to Section 2C makes clear that its general prohibitions
have relevance to the issues being discussed. It states:

a judge's membership in an organization that engages in any
discriminatory membership practices prohibited by the law of the
jurisdiction also violates Canon 2 and Section 2A and gives the
appearance of impropriety. In addition, it would be a violation of
Canon 2 and Section 2A for a judge to arrange a meeting at a club that
the judge knows practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, religion or national origin in its membership or other policies, or
for the judge to regularly use such a club. Moreover, public
manifestation by a judge of the judge's knowing approval of invidious
discrimination on any basis gives the appearance of impropriety under
Canon 2 and diminishes public confidence in the89 integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, in violation of Section 2A.
One member of the ABA committee that drafted the 1990 version
of the Code of Judicial Conduct has expressed the opinion that Section
2A would be violated by a judge who publicly and knowingly belongs to
"an organization that engages in invidiously discriminatory membership
practices on the basis of sexual orientation" even in a jurisdiction that
had not added that category to the characteristics listed in Section 2C. 90
If that conclusion is correct, then judges need to make rather wideranging investigations to discover discriminatory policies in
organizations they join that might conceivably be deemed invidious.
But judges' problems may be even more far-reaching. The
Massachusetts Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics that concluded in
its Opinion 2002-11 that the Masons did not practice "invidious
discrimination" under Section 2C did not give the inquiring judge a
green light for continued membership and leadership. 9' It went on to
advise that "the provisions of Canon 2(A) can be applied to prohibit or
discipline membership in an organization that does not 'invidiously'
discriminate within the meaning of Canon 2C.,, 92 That conclusion, if
generally accepted, would make the task of judges desiring to join
organizations even more difficult. It is not just the invidiously
88. See id.
Section 4A (2003). 89. See id Section 2C cmt. (2003).
90. M. Peter Moser, The 1990 A.B.A. Code of Judicial Conduct: A Model for the Future,4
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 731, 743 (1990); see GRAY, supranote 2, at 12-13.
91. See Op. 2002-11, supra note 40.
92. Id.
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discriminating organization they would have to worry about but any
organization in which membership would raise any question about
impartiality, that is, any controversial organization. As we have seen, it
may be difficult, or impossible, to obtain an advisory opinion about the
permissibility of joining any particular organization.
It is true that Sections 2A and 4A have been interpreted as
forbidding membership in organizations other than those that invidiously
discriminate. But, as noted previously, the prohibited organizations have
been either those that frequently appear in court or those that have a
partisan agenda with respect to issues that appear in litigation, like a
police-sponsored anti-crime organization. 93 That seems to be a quite
legitimate use of Sections 2A and 4A because they are linked quite
specifically to activities of particular judges in the context of their
judicial activity. I believe, however, that it is a mistake to use these
generally-worded Sections to add additional per se exclusionary
categories to the ones listed in Section 2C. Jurisdictions that have added
categories have considered carefully what categories they wish to add,
with whatever opportunity for outside input they have chosen to afford,
and have given notice of their decisions in the wording of Section 2C
that they have chosen. Small advisory committees, with no such input
and with no opportunity for review by the judicial body that normally
does the "legislating" in this field, should not be adding additional
categories of prohibited subjects of invidious discrimination. And
certainly judicial conduct commissions should not be adding such
categories in the context of discipline cases. For the same reason, I
believe it is not wise for an advisory committee to use a general
provision like Section 2A to raise a question about the permissibility of
joining organizations that discriminate on the basis of one of the listed
categories when the advisory committee has already concluded that the
discrimination is not "invidious. 94

93. See supra text accompanying note 31.
94. Of course there are other issues that may arise when a judge is contemplating joining an
organization, such as whether the organization regularly appears in the courts or whether the
organization has a partisan agenda that is relevant to issues that are regularly presented to the courts.
Such particular issues were not presented in Opinion 2002-11. A final footnote about Section 2A is
to note that the Commentary states that it would be a violation for a judge "to regularly use such a
club." See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C cmt. (2003). That should constitute a
note of warning to golf-loving judges who like to attend the Masters golf tournament at Augusta
National every year-unless a golf-loving advisory committee would not define such conduct as a
"use" of the club.
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After reviewing federal and state constitutional cases dealing with
the powers of government to regulate its employees' expressive
activities, the Massachusetts Advisory Committee's Opinion 2002-11
told the inquiring judge that
[t]he determination of [Section] 2(A)'s permissible applicability...
turns on balancing the government's interest in promoting the
appearance and actuality of an impartial judiciary with your interest in
Masons membership, or leadership, and any adverse impact on the
government's interest that flows from your participation in the
Masons.
But the Committee concluded that it was unable to help the judge:
The kind of highly fact-sensitive inquiry required to arrive at the
appropriate balance simply is impossible in the case at hand without a
clearer picture of the variables noted above, including a better
understanding of the public assessment of the impact of involvement in
the Masons and a richer understanding of the organization and the
judge's interest in it.... Our inability to render a dispositive opinion
stems, in part, from the inherent ambiguity of Sections 2(C) and 2(A).
The dearth of developed commentary to guide the committee in
answering these important and policy-laden questions is particularly
frustrating. The committee hopes that the pending proposed revisions
of the Code95of Judicial Conduct will offer additional guidance for
future cases.

The Committee talked about a "highly fact-sensitive inquiry" that
would be essential to any final conclusion. It is hard to see how any
revision of the commentary would help that very much. Perhaps it would
help if a revision forbade the use of Section 2A to add additional per se
exclusionary categories. The Committee also referred to the frustrating
lack of developed commentary with respect to these policy-laden
questions and its hope for future help. The reference is to the fact that at
the time it was writing its opinion, a committee of the Supreme Judicial
Court was engaged in a four-year project to rewrite the Massachusetts
Code of Judicial Conduct. As a member of that latter committee, I think
I violate no confidence when I express my own frustration at its inability
to be able to agree on any wording that would relieve the advisory
committee's frustration. It was able to agree that Section 2C should be
95. Op. 2002-11, supra note 40.
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worded as a part of the law of judicial professional responsibility apart
from constitutional requirements and it agreed with some other states
that the commentary should reflect the notion that "invidious
discrimination" included the concept of stigmatization. But efforts to be
more specific, to deal with the troublesome definitional issues discussed
in this paper, foundered.
The conclusion reached by Opinion 2002-11 that the commentary
as written included constitutional limitations on the membership
prohibition required the committee to conclude that its answer turned on
the balance between the government's interest and the individual's
interest, as quoted above. That judgment is essentially the judgment
whether state or federal constitutional provisions prevented Section 2A
from being applied to prevent the state from forbidding judicial
membership in the Masons. That judgment must be made whether or not
constitutional principles are written into the definition of "invidious
discrimination" in Section 2C or the general definition of Section 2A or
Section 4A. Whether advisory committees will give advice about those
issues is another matter, but that issue is beyond the scope of this paper
except to note that the ability to get advice is of critical importance to a
judge seeking the safe harbor that advice affords in some jurisdictions.
But it is time now to turn to the constitutional issue that exists in the
application of Section 2C to specific organizations.
V.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE

Up to this point we have been considering the interpretation of
Section 2C as involving issues of the law of judicial professional
responsibility. But once those questions get sorted out, there is a more
fundamental question that needs to be addressed-the effect of the First
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, and similar state constitutional
prohibitions, on the restrictions that Section 2C, however interpreted,
and Section 2A place on judges' rights of freedom of association.
A.

AssociationRights of Organizations

The thrust of Section 2C is aimed directly at the conduct of judges.
But in so regulating the conduct of judges, Section 2C also regulates the
named organizations by telling them that they may not have a certain
class of citizens as members. The organizations' First Amendment rights
are thus also implicated. Organizational freedom of association has had a
checkered career in the Supreme Court. In a series of cases, the Court
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has upheld state regulations prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
race, creed, or gender by organizations operating places of public
accommodation and/or found to be predominantly commercial. In
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court in an opinion by Justice
Brennan held that Minnesota did not abridge the freedom of association
of the U.S. Jaycees by finding the organization to constitute a place of
public accommodation and hence required not to discriminate in its
membership policies against women.9 6 The Jaycees were a nonprofit
educational and civic organization formed to advance the interests of
young men's civic organizations. Full membership was limited to men
between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, although older men and
women could be associates. In finding that the state had a compelling
interest in preventing invidious discrimination, the Court noted that the
Minnesota statute imposed "no restrictions on the organization's ability
to exclude individuals with ideologies
or philosophies different from
97
those of its existing members.,
The Court subsequently reaffirmed its holding in Board of
Directors of Rotary Internationalv. Rotary Club of Duarte98 and New
York State Club Association v. New York. 99 The Court analyzed freedom
of association as containing two elements: a freedom of intimate
association that protected certain human relationships because of their
central role in preserving individual freedom, and a freedom of
expressive association that saw the right to engage in joint expressive
activity as an "indispensable means of preserving other individual
liberties."' 00 The Court found that the regulation of the kinds of
semipublic clubs involved in the cited cases did not implicate the first
kind of freedom of association at all and did not infringe substantially on
the second kind of freedom either. Any kind of incidental abridgement
was more than outweighed by the compelling interest in preventing
11
"invidious discrimination."''
The New York State Club litigation involved a facial attack on the
statute. The Court had no doubt that many of the private clubs fell within
the Roberts and Rotary Club guidelines and hence held that the attack

96. See 468 U.S. 609, 626-27 (1984).
97. See id.at 612-13, 627.
98. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
99. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).

100. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
101.

See New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 8-9, 12-13; Bd. of Dir. Of Rotary Int'l, 481

U.S. at 547, 549; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-29.
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failed. 10 2 Justice White did, however, say that it was conceivable that "an
association might be able to show that it is organized for specific
expressive purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its desired
to
viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership
03
those who share the same sex, for example, or the same religion."'
The hint that Roberts and Rotary Club should not be read too
broadly came to fruition in two subsequent cases. The first was Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.10 4 Boston
had authorized a veterans' group to conduct a St. Patrick's DayEvacuation Day parade and that group refused to permit the IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group to march. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the veterans' group had
violated the state public accommodations law but the Supreme Court
unanimously held that such an interpretation was unconstitutional.
Under the First Amendment, the veterans' group had0 5 a right to control
the content of its own expressive activity, the parade.'
The Court expanded on this theme in Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale.10 6 New Jersey's application of its public accommodations law to
require the Boy Scouts to reinstate an assistant scoutmaster, dismissed
because he was an activist gay, was also held, by a closely-divided
Court, to violate the First Amendment's right of association. Roberts
was distinguished on the ground that state regulation in that case was not
seen as placing a "serious burden on the male members' freedom of
expressive association.' 1 7 For purposes of this paper we do not need to
decide whether the majority or the dissent was correct in its analysis of
just what expressive activity of the Boy Scouts was being protected,
whether it warranted constitutional protection, and whether Roberts was
all that different. It is enough to note that the Court went rather far in
holding that the First Amendment was a barrier to application of state
anti-discrimination laws when application of the statute was thought to
interfere
with expressive activity of the organization in a substantial
08
way.1
This line of cases has a relationship to Section 2C in that the less
impact that the First Amendment has on the ability of states to bar
102. See New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 9, 13.
103. Id. at 13.
104. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
105. See id. at 563-66, 573.
106. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
107. Id. at 658.
108. See id. at 644, 658-59.
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organizations themselves from engaging in discriminatory membership
policies, the less danger there is to efforts to bar judges from joining
such organizations. Conversely, the more impact the First Amendment
has, the more it protects discriminatory membership policies, the more
the courts recognize the impact that anti-discrimination policies have on
impeding the ability of certain organizations to carry on expressive
conduct, then the more the First Amendment enables organizations
themselves to claim its protection when the state forbids its employees
from joining such organizations. It does not follow from cases like
Hurley and Dale that, just because an organization's membership
policies are protected by the First Amendment, a state may not prevent
its judges from joining it. Additional considerations exist that need to be
considered. But Hurley and Dale are relevant to the issue because they
tell us the extent to which the First Amendment is already relevant to the
larger issue of accommodating constitutionally protected freedom of
association and state anti-discrimination policy.
B. AssociationRights of Government Employees
There is a group of Supreme Court cases that addresses more
directly the power of government to impose restrictions on the First
Amendment association rights of its employees in the name of
advancing the purposes of government service. Oliver Wendell Holmes
once told us that "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."' 0 9 That
theory has disappeared--or has it? Section 2C now tells judges, "You
may have a constitutional right to join an organization that discriminates
invidiously, but you have no constitutional right to be a judge." Seventyfive years after Holmes's opinion, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court
in Keyishian v. Board of Regents," 0 stated that the State University of
New York could not dismiss faculty members who would not sign a
certificate stating that they were not members of the Communist Party:
"legislation which sanctions membership unaccompanied by specific
intent to further the unlawful goals of the organization or which is not
active membership violates constitutional limitations.""' This language,
written in the context of protecting teachers, certainly has relevance for

109. McAuliffe v. Mayor, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
110. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
111. Id.at 608.
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the prohibition of judicial membership in organizations not engaged in
unlawful activities.
The application of the First Amendment to the associational rights
of government employees has had a mixed history in the Supreme Court.
On the one hand, the Court has recognized that government has a
significant employment interest that justifies a restriction of employees'
First Amendment rights, whether of speech or of association. On the
other hand, it has looked carefully at the nature of the rights being
restricted and held in a number of cases that the restriction is too great to
stand. In the first category are cases like United Public Workers v.
Mitchell 1 2 and US. Civil Service Comm 'n v. Letter Carriers,113 which
upheld restrictions on the political activities of federal employees, 1 4 and
Connick v. Myers." 5 Connick upheld the dismissal of an assistant district
attorney for resisting a transfer and for insubordination. In resisting the
transfer, she had conducted a survey of her colleagues, asking questions
about transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee,
confidence in supervisors, and pressure to work in political
campaigns. 116 The Court did not adopt an analysis that began with
recognition of the employee's First Amendment rights and then looked
for a compelling interest of the state in regulating them. It used the
analysis of Pickering v. Boardof Education,"17 which held that:
the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech
of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses
in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in
general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
8
it performs through its employees. 1
Connick emphasized the "public concern" language of Pickering and
held that as a general rule it would not interfere with government
personnel decisions when triggered by employee speech unless that
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

330 U.S. 75 (1947).
413 U.S. 548 (1973).
Seeid. at556.
461 U.S. 138 (1983). See also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
See Connick, 461 U.S. at 141-42.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Id.at 568.
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speech related to a matter of public concern. The Court concluded that
most of the survey's questions did not relate to matters of public concern
but were rather extensions of the employee's own grievance. Even the
question of pressure to participate in political campaigns, while a matter
of public concern, was only so to a limited extent, given the relation to
her own grievance and the fact that the speech occurred in the office.
The government's reasonable belief that the employee's actions would
likely disrupt the office outweighed what the Court saw as a limited First
Amendment interest.' 1 9
A second category of government employee cases has used cases
like Keyishian to reach a different result. Elrod v. Burns,12 ° Branti v.
Finkel,12 1 and Rutan v. Republican Party122 held that decisions about
hiring and firing governmental employees could not constitutionally be
based on whether the employees belonged to or supported the governing
political party unless party affiliation was important to carrying out the
public office. Mitchell and Letter Carriers were distinguished on the
ground that employees' First Amendment rights in those cases were
restricted in order to protect other First Amendment rights, namely, to
protect employees' beliefs and associational rights from political
pressure. 123 Elrod, Branti, and Rutan gave constitutional protection to
the right of government employees to belong to the political party of
their choice, or no political party, against an assertion of a strong
government interest in promoting the carrying out of public policy
declared by the government in power.
And so we come once again to Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, in which the Court held unconstitutional the Minnesota Code of
Judicial Conduct's prohibition against announcing one's views on
disputed legal issues in the course of a judicial election.' 24 The Court of
Appeals had upheld the provision, finding that it served the compelling
state interests of preserving the impartiality and the appearance of
impartiality of the judiciary. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court's 5-4
majority, shredded the state's argument that the prohibition was
narrowly tailored to preserve a compelling state interest in preserving
impartiality and the appearance of impartiality. He also analyzed the

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 148-49, 152-54.
427 U.S. 347 (1976).
445 U.S. 507 (1980).
497 U.S. 62 (1990).
See, e.g., Elrod,427 U.S. at 370-71.
536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
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concepts of impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in a way that
seems relevant to interpretation of Section 2C. In particular, over strong
dissent, he suggested that impartiality in the sense of a lack of
preconception with respect to a particular legal view, as opposed to lack
of bias against a particular party, is not a compelling interest. The Court
did not pass on the question whether impartiality in the sense of openmindedness was a compelling interest because it concluded that that was
not the purpose of the announce clause. Under strict scrutiny the state
would have had to show that campaign statements were uniquely
destructive of open-mindedness and it could not do so in view of the
many ways in which judges were permitted to express views about legal
issues on and off the bench. 125 It seems doubtful that organization
membership is any more destructive of open-mindedness. Dale and
White, read together, represent very forceful, strongly absolutist readings
of the First Amendment that pose a threat to some applications of
Section 2C.
C. The FirstAmendment, Section 2C, the Boy Scouts, and the Masons
Let us think again about the application of Section 2C or Section
2A to membership in the Boy Scouts in those jurisdictions that have
added "sexual orientation" to the list of forbidden categories or that
might use Section 2A to achieve the same result, or its application to
membership in the Masons in a jurisdiction that has concluded that their
gender discrimination is "invidious." Would such applications violate
the First Amendment?
As to the Boy Scouts, the argument would be that the prohibition of
membership was a content-based restriction on expressive activity and
that it violated both the judge's right of intimate association and his right
of expressive association. As to the former, a judge who was a
scoutmaster of his son's troop would argue that the prohibition abridged
his right to join an organization that fosters his view of family values in
both its membership policies and in its activities. The judge would argue
that the decision with respect to his membership rights ought to apply
equally to any attempt to categorically prohibit membership in a gay and
lesbian organization. Associating with others favoring a heterosexual or
homosexual lifestyle is certainly in the same ballpark with activities
discussed by Justice Brennan in Roberts: "In one line of decisions, the
Court has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain
125. See id. at 775-81.
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intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by
the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding 'the
126
individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme."
Brennan went on to identify some of the intimate human relationships
deemed worthy of protection:
we have noted that certain kinds of personal bonds have played
a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they
thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the
individual and the power of the State.... The personal affiliations that exemplify these considerations.., are those that
attend the creation and sustenance of a family-marriage,
childbirth, the raising and education
of children, and
127
relatives.
one's
with
cohabitation
In dealing with the question whether the freedom of intimate
association of an organization, the U.S. Jaycees, was involved, the Court
in Roberts concluded that it was not. Its local chapters were neither
small-the ones involved in the case had 400 or more members-nor
selective, and many of its central activities involved participation of
strangers. 28 The Boy Scouts present a more difficult case. The local
troops are relatively small and while not generally selective, their
"straight" policy does involve a certain selectiveness. Dale was decided
on the basis that that policy was important to their mission, 129 and moral
straightness is certainly closer to the intimate family values identified in
Roberts than the policies involved in Roberts. The same argument ought
to protect membership in LAMBDA. In Dale, however, the Boy Scouts
argued and prevailed on the ground that it was their expressive freedom
of association rights, not their intimate association rights, that were
abridged.130 Presumably, Dale would apply to the gender policies of the
Boy Scouts as well as to their sexual orientation policy. It might even
apply to the Masons.
The California Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of Boy
Scouts membership in light of Dale. It amended its Section 2C and
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

468 U.S. at 617-18.
Id. at 618-19 (citations omitted).
Seeid. at 620-21.
See id. at 654.
Seeid at656.
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Commentary. 1 31 The California Section 2C contains an exception for
membership in a "nonprofit youth organization" so long as it does not
violate Section 4A, 132 and the Commentary explicitly states that the
purpose of the exception is "to accommodate individual rights of
intimate association and free expression., 133 The California Supreme
Court also amended the disqualification Section and Commentary to
provide for disclosure of membership in organizations when "the judge
believes the parties or their lawyers might consider this information
relevant to the question of disqualification" and to suggest that
membership in certain organizations sometimes may have "the potential
to give an appearance of partiality" even when membership generally is
not prohibited. 134 The Commentary therefore states that judges "should"
disqualify
themselves whenever appropriate under the Sections or
35
statute.1
One interesting feature about the Court's opinion in Dale is that
while the Court did note, quoting Roberts, that freedom of expressive
association "could be overridden 'by regulations adopted to serve
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms."",136 The Court distinguished the earlier cases in
which it had held that the state had a compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination against women on the ground of the organizations' failure
in those cases to demonstrate a serious burden on their expressive
purposes. 137 One conceivable interpretation of that way of stating the
distinction is that once such a burden is established, the state's
compelling interest is irrelevant, that the freedom of association right
that was recognized was nearly absolute. But elsewhere in the opinion,
the Court did say that "in these cases, the associational interest in
131. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, SUPREME COURT TAKES ACTION ON CALIFORNIA
CODE
OF
JUDICIAL
ETHICS,
available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/
newsreleases/NR37-03.HTM (June 18, 2003); see also CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Section 2C
(2004).
132. See CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Section 2C (2004). "A judge shall conduct all of the

judge's extrajudicial activities so that they do not (1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity
to act impartially; (2) demean the judicial office; or (3) interfere with the proper performance of
judicial duties." CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Section 4A (2004).
133. CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Section 2C cmt. (2004).
134. Id. Section 3E.
135. See id. Section 3E cmt.
136. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623
(1984)).
137. See id.at 657-58.
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freedom of expression has been set on one side of the scale, and the
State's interest on the other," but it concluded that the state interests
embodied in the public accommodations law "do not justify such a
severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive
association."' 138 We are not told why that was so. One factor may well be
indicated by language in the Court's discussion of the public
accommodations law that its coverage had been pushed very far beyond
"traditional places of public accommodation" to membership
organizations.13 9 A related explanation may involve the absence of the
quasi-commercial aspect of Roberts. The Court did not say whether the
protected purpose of the Boy Scouts, moral straightness, as opposed to
the gender discrimination in Roberts, also made a difference.
Dale is relevant in assessing the constitutionality of using Sections
2C or 2A to prohibit a judge from joining the Boy Scouts or Masons, but
not controlling because the issue involves the regulation by government
of the conduct of its own employee, and a high-ranking employee at that.
I assume therefore that the existence of a compelling interest and the
narrowness of the remedy will also be important to any constitutional
resolution. I have discussed earlier the kind of compelling interests that
seem to lie behind Section 2C and the problematic justification of
assuring impartiality. It is true that the one type of impartiality
justification credited wholeheartedly by Justice Scalia in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White was impartiality that consisted of bias
against the individual litigant or lawyer. 40 A gay or lesbian or woman
may well assert quite reasonably that he or she would fear the lack of
impartiality of a judge who belonged to an organization that engaged in
discrimination against gays or lesbians or women. But current law would
probably require more than that to compel disqualification in a particular
case. As noted above, Catholic judges regularly sit in cases involving
abortion. A successful disqualification motion normally requires a
particularized showing of bias, more than simply membership in an
organization, 141 and if such a showing of bias could be made by a gay or
lesbian party or litigant, then the judge should be disqualified. But in the
current state of disqualification law, prohibition of membership in the
Boy Scouts or the Masons does not seem like a narrowly tailored remedy
for the compelling state interest of assuring an impartial judge.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.at 658-59.
Id. at 656-57.
See White, 536 U.S. at 775-76.
See Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 659-60 (10th Cir. 2002).
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Moreover, as noted above, the blunderbuss remedy also implicates the
associational rights of the organizations that were recognized in Dale.
The earlier suggestion that more than concern for impartiality
explains the addition of Section 2C to codes of judicial conduct has
special relevance for the constitutional argument. I have suggested that
the prohibition can be understood as a symbol of the strength of the
institutional, or even more, the moral principle that lies behind the antidiscrimination language of Section 2C. The state is backing that
principle up by forbidding particularly high-level employees, those who
administer its law, to have anything to do with organizations that engage
in certain kinds of particularly harmful discrimination. The fact that
private organizations may not, because of constitutional freedom of
association, be prohibited from engaging in the discriminatory conduct
does not mean that the state cannot prohibit its judges from being
involved, even indirectly through mere membership, with that conduct.
Stating Section 2C's goal so broadly demonstrates why recusal or
disqualification in individual cases does not fulfill its aim, for recusal or
disqualification in individual cases does not dissociate the state's
judiciary from the discriminatory conduct.
That formulation sets forth the state's compelling interest in its
strongest form. The narrow tailoring argument would be that preventing
certain memberships for judges is the only way to express the moral
principle of dissociating the justice system from prohibited
discrimination. A counter-argument would note that the state's argument
is made in the abstract, without reference to any particular organization.
With respect to organizations such as the Boy Scouts and the Masons,
the many good works the organizations perform diminish the state's
compelling interest because they make it more difficult to tie a judgemember to the discriminatory policy than in the situation where
discrimination is the central purpose of the organization-where the
organization is in essence a "hate organization." The association of the
judiciary with the organization's discriminatory policies through judicial
memberships is therefore somewhat attenuated.
Moreover, if the impartiality issue may be handled by recusal or
disqualification motions, then the connection between the purpose of the
prohibition and the judicial function is also weakened. The symbolic
effect would be the same for judges as for any high government official.
I do not mean to say that there is no symbolic effect. There is. But it is
not enhanced by any special quality of the judicial role if one discounts
the impartiality function. Second, we should note that elimination of
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Section 2C would not involve any wholesale rollback of state antidiscrimination policy. When considering the Boy Scouts and the
Masons, we are talking only about the area of personal liberty beyond
the commercial and quasi-commercial organizations whose membership
policies were found regulable in cases like Roberts and Rotary Clubthe area already covered by many state public accommodation laws,
except for the small area constitutionally protected by Dale.
The Court that decided White indicated that political speech
implicated core First Amendment values. But that Court also valued the
freedom of expressive association very highly in Dale, and it might well
conclude that membership in political parties-which after all did not
exist at the time the First Amendment was passed-is no more a core
First Amendment value than membership in private expressive
associations. Moreover, the prohibitions of Sections 2C and 2A apply to
expressive activity outside the workplace whereas Connick involved
expressive activity in the workplace, where the government interest is
stronger, and Letter Carriersand Mitchell purported at least to protect
the workplace values of safeguarding employees from pressure to
engage in political activities. The cases that seem closest to the Section
2C and 2A situations are Elrod,Branti, and Rutan, for they held that the
strong government interest in furthering the public policies of the
governing bureaucracy did not permit it to prohibit certain government
42
employees from joining the opposing political party.
My purpose in this Section has not been to arrive at a normative
theory of the First Amendment that would test the various applications
of Section 2C and 2A discussed in this paper. Such a goal would require
the rewriting of most of the opinions discussed in this Section. My
purpose has been to suggest that aside from the ambiguities of language
and policy choices and the interpretative difficulty inherent in the
language of Sections 2C and 2A, there is also a problem under current

142. A two-way street interpretation of Section 2C may have an unanticipated bite. If the
gender policy of the Boy Scouts does not have First Amendment protection, is there not an equal
protection issue if Section 2C is interpreted not to apply to the Girl Scouts? Or to put the issue more
narrowly, if the judicial membership policy of Section 2C prohibits male judges from joining the
Boy Scouts because of their gender policy, is there not an equal protection problem if Section 2C is
interpreted to permit female judges to be scout leaders in the Girl Scouts? We are not in an area
where the arguments for dividing discrimination into categories of "invidious" and "benign" are
strongest. We are talking about the memberships permitted to a small class of powerful government
officials, and it does not seem persuasive to argue that female or gay and lesbian judges should be
permitted to join exclusive organizations favoring their interests but that male and straight judges
should not be permitted to join exclusive organizations favoring their interests.
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Supreme Court doctrine in accommodating the principles of freedom of
association with the prohibitions of those Sections, at least in some of
their applications. And if the Supreme Court were ever to conclude that
Sections 2C and 2A could not constitutionally be applied to judicial
membership in the Boy Scouts or Masons, then the further possibility
exists for attack on the constitutionality of prohibiting judicial
membership in other organizations that do not operate in the area of
public accommodations, perhaps even what we would regard as "core"
hate groups-leaving it to recusal or the disqualification process in
individual cases and to political pressure at the time of nomination,
confirmation, or election to deal with the social and political problems at
which Section 2C and 2A are aimed.
The existence of that problem presents great difficulty for
conscientious judges. Advisory committees will have a hard enough time
with the interpretive problems presented by Sections 2C and 2A.
Resolution of constitutional issues is not within the jurisdiction of many,
most, or all of those committees and even if it were, resolving a difficult
constitutional question in an advisory context without adversary
presentation before a court accustomed to handling constitutional issues
seems a poor way of proceeding. Another alternative, in which judges
deliberately subject themselves to judicial discipline that may be
reviewed by a court, seems a dangerous way of proceeding. It is
theoretically possible that a judge with sufficient resources could
proceed by way of declaratory judgment, but that seems unlikely. The
final alternative of not joining an organization, if there is doubt about the
propriety of such action, seems a likely outcome in a great many cases.
If a chilling effect on joining controversial organizations is one of the
purposes of the adoption of Section 2C and 2A, it is likely to achieve
that goal.
CONCLUSION

Any effort to distinguish among different kinds of discrimination is
bound to leave many problems of interpretation. My point, however, has
been that the choice of Section 2C and its Commentary to focus on
"invidious'' discrimination left considerably more "muddle" than is
either necessary or wise. The mistake is compounded by the difficulty
for judges who are trying to comply with Section 2C by getting
authoritative and helpful advice.
There are several ways of resolving the problems with Section 2C
and its Commentary as currently written. 1) Leave the language of
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"invidious discrimination" as it is and resolve all the interpretive
problems with detailed commentary; 2)Replace the language of
"invidious discrimination" with "unlawful discrimination"; 3)Replace
the language of "invidious discrimination" with language that reaches
only "hate groups"; 4)Replace the prohibition of organization
membership with a requirement of disclosure of membership in all
organizations; and 5)Eliminate Section 2C entirely and leave the
solution to the law of disqualification 43and to general legislation
applicable to all high government officials. 1
Alternative 1): Leave the prohibition as is. The previous discussion
indicates that there are several major interpretive problems. Whether the
existence of invidious discrimination should be determined by reference
to the perception of the alleged victim is a difficult question. While the
original drafters wrote in those terms, an explicit statement that that was
the guiding principle would likely raise fears of something akin to "the
heckler's veto"--that the views of the most sensitive and the most
extreme would be likely to control. Single-sex schools and colleges
could fall under the ban. On the other hand, any test that does not take
account of the victim's perspective will raise other concerns-for
example, that the all-male golf club or the Masons will survive such a
test. Use of a term like "the reasonable person" is not useful, for it does
not tell us whether the reasonable person is a "reasonable victim" or not.
Likewise, any effort to define precisely the "practice of invidious
discrimination" is likely to run into similar difficulties. The statement of
a rule that (substantial) racial or religious or ethnic imbalance involves
the "practice" of invidious discrimination is likely to raise fears that
Section 2C is telling judges that they may join only organizations with
ethnic, gender, and religious balances that mirror the demographics of
the American public generally or of the citizenry of their states, thus
negating one of the distinctive qualities differentiating organizations.
Negating that notion invites tokenism. The safe harbors also may create
some anomalies, as we have noted especially with respect to religious
organizations and private, intimate organizations. It does not work to say
that the core meaning is clear and that problems exist, as they always
exist with definitions, at the margins. Where Section 2C is concerned,
the margins are where the action is. Although I personally favor greater
specificity because of the desirability of candor (or, to use a favorite

143.

1 do not mean in this solution to eliminate the applicability of Section 2A to situations

where joining an organization has a relationship to matters coming before the judge.
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political and academic term, because of the desirability of transparency)
and because of the need to give greater guidance to judges, my suspicion
is that an effort to resolve the interpretive problems with Section 2C with
any greater degree of specificity than at present would dissolve the
consensus that currently supports the generalized prohibition.
Alternative 2): Making unlawful discrimination, not invidious
discrimination, the operative prohibition. This is the solution chosen by
Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Washington in
their versions of Section 2C.144 That substitution limits the impact of
Section 2C to situations where the legislature has acted with respect to
discrimination by named organizations and named categories of
discrimination, thus eliminating most of the non-constitutional problems
with the language of current Section 2C discussed earlier in this paper.
As Boy Scouts v. Dale indicates, using the language of "unlawful"
discrimination will not eliminate constitutional problems because the
application of the statute may be subject to constitutional attack.
However, any interpretive problems that remain with respect to the
statutes of those states will be dealt with in the course of litigation in
which there will be adverse parties presenting diverse views and not in
one-sided presentations followed by advisory opinions based on
assumed facts. Moreover, legislatures are probably better suited to
legislate new categories of prohibited activities attuned to the "moral
consensus" of their communities.
One problem with this solution is the commonness of litigation
involving unlawful discrimination. Large organizations make dozens or
hundreds of personnel decisions every day, and some of them may lead
to claims of unlawful discrimination. Any large organization may have
several such suits pending at any given time. Does the pendency of such
litigation indicate that the organization may be practicing "unlawful
discrimination"? Would judges with knowledge of such litigation be
required to investigate and reach a conclusion in order to determine their
own status? Suppose that discrimination suits have been settled with a
monetary payment, but no admission of guilt? Does practice of unlawful
discrimination require a judicial finding? Indeed, what does "practice"
mean in this context? Does one successful lawsuit relating to one
individual demonstrate "the practice" of invidious discrimination? Or
should the Commentary explicitly state that "practice" requires a
pattern?
144. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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These interpretive problems are alleviated by the fact that Section
4D(3) forbids judges to be officers, directors, or employees of most
business entities. 145 They will thus not be caught up in much of the main
source of discrimination litigation. However, judges do serve on the
boards of directors of non-profit organizations, and one type of nonprofit organization, the educational organization, is a frequent target of
discrimination lawsuits, by faculty denied tenure, by employees, and by
would-be students. These problems ought to be a source of concern to
any judge serving on the board of an educational institution that is the
subject of such a suit. Indeed, a judge on the board of any private
institution that maintains an affirmative action program that does not
comport with the Supreme Court's current view of what would be
unconstitutional for a government-run institution ought to be concerned
whether Section
2C is worded in terms of unlawful or invidious
46
1
discrimination.
This solution chosen by the six states named above does not
account for the fact that judges occupy a special place in the community
structure so that perhaps special rules are needed to assure public
confidence in the judiciary. However, Section 2C seems more directed to
the practices of specific organizations rather than to individual judges'
beliefs and, as already noted, there is a disconnect between the
categorical prohibition of membership contained in Section 2C and the
standards for recusal and disqualification, which generally refuse to
impute organizational mission and practice to their judicial members.
A solution that focuses on an organization's unlawful activities
would not need to make any exceptions for favored organizationscultural heritage and religious organizations and intimate, purely private
groups. If their discrimination were "unlawful," then the judge would be
forbidden from joining.
Alternative 3): Coverage of "hate groups." Another problem with
Alternative 2) is that there are likely to be organizations not covered by
existing legislation-perhaps because they are not places of "public
accommodation"-that are core hate groups. It is not very likely that a
judge would belong to such a group-although with elected judges, one
can never tell-and perhaps political and public pressure would be
sufficient to cause a judge to avoid such an organization, especially if
the Sections were amended to require a judge to disclose organizational
145.

See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 4D(3) (2003).

146. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
indicate the dimensions of the problem.
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connections in much the same way as they are now required to disclose
financial information. 47 If it were thought desirable, perhaps legislation
could be drafted that sufficiently defined a core hate group as an
organization that discriminates on the basis of race, religion, nationality,
and any other groups that one wanted to include and then forbade a
judge to join such an organization. Perhaps the definition could be
restricted by including a link to advocacy or practice of violence. Such a
prohibition could either stand by itself as a substitution for Section 2C or
it could be added to a prohibition based on "unlawful" discrimination,
but drafting an acceptable, constitutional provision would not be easy.
Since the organizations themselves are not being outlawed, the First
Amendment problems, while not eliminated, seem diminished when we
are talking about the compelling interest of the state in prohibiting a
judge from belonging to a core hate group. It seems more persuasive to
attribute the views of such an organization to its members. In that case
we are talking about the real possibility of lack of impartiality (and
indeed partiality too) not just with respect to issues but also with respect
to litigants themselves. Perhaps it would be possible to deal with that
problem through motions for disqualification in individual cases, but the
symbolic effect of judicial membership in such organizations seems
great.
The real problem with focusing on core hate groups is that to avoid
the possibility that many core hate groups would define their mission in
broader terms than simply hate, the prohibition contained in a redrafted
Section 2C would likely end up not much different from its present
form. We have a recent relevant example in the effort to make the
"pledges and promises" prohibition on judicial candidates effective by
adding the "announce clause" prohibition. That drafting148technique was
struck down in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.
Alternative 4): Disclosure requirement. The solution of disclosure,
without any prohibition of membership-expanding the California
Supreme Court solution to the Boy Scouts issue-derives from two
complementary ideas. The first is that Section 2C raises too many
problems, leaves too many uncertainties, and potentially is too chilling
of judges' associational rights. The second is that the political, social,
147.

See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Sections 4H-I (2003).

148. Compare In re Watson, N.Y.2d (2003) with In re Raab, N.Y.2d (2003) (upholding the
constitutionality of the "pledges and promises" clause in New York's Code of Judicial Conduct and
then upholding the prohibition against various types of political activity by judges apart from their
own campaigns for judicial office).
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and media pressures that accompany disclosure will have the desired
effect of keeping judges out of undesirable organizations without
creating the legal difficulties embodied in current Section 2C. We do
rely on disclosure in many areas of our civic life. Securities law, which
has a great deal of strict regulation, relies on disclosure to deal with a
number of matters of importance to investors. But the effectiveness of
disclosure varies widely. There is not a great deal of incentive to monitor
closely the activities of judges. Judges already file financial disclosure
forms in almost all jurisdictions. 149 Some forms show a fair amount of
variety in the nonjudicial income of judges, but the information revealed
does not interest the media or the public very much. I suspect that
disclosure with respect to organizations joined by judges will become a
matter of public interest only in situations where public attention will
serve the interest of particular political and social groups.
The remedy of disclosure, if chosen, is not without its own
interpretive problem. The question will arise: what to disclose? One
issue will be whether to disclose past organizational affiliations. If a
purpose of disclosure is to give parties and the public a basis for assuring
itself of judicial impartiality and the appearance of impartiality, then past
organizational memberships, at least for a reasonable time before
becoming or attempting to become a judge, will be relevant. A second
question will be what constitutes an organization for purposes of
disclosure. It may not be enough to use the formalities of organization,
such as a charter, by-laws, or mission statement, as a guide. Some fairly
nasty organizations in our recent history have operated without such
formalities. But too expansive a definition may be quite intrusive and
could literally reach to groups of friends that meet regularly. But the
problem is not a new one. The present Section 2C contains no definition
of "organization," although the exception for an "intimate, purely
private" organization suggests that some pretty small, informal groups
are included within the concept. 50 Requiring disclosure of membership
in all such organizations only makes the problem more acute. Indeed, a
very broad requirement of disclosure could raise its own constitutional
problems.
Alternative 5): Eliminate Section 2C. This solution represents a
conclusion that Section 2C and its Commentary are unsatisfactory
because they leave so many questions unanswered. With no practical
149. See JEFFREY SHAMAN, STEVEN LUBET & JAMES ALFINI, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS
251 (2d ed. 1995).
150. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Section 2C cmt. (2003).
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mechanism of answering them, they end up chilling judges' First
Amendment rights and, if the premises of the Section and its
Commentary are correct, there is another, less intrusive, way to achieve
many of its objectives. To the extent that membership in an organization
that practices stigmatizing discrimination does indeed justify an
inference of lack of impartiality, either as a matter of bias toward or
against a party or as a matter of lack of sufficient open-mindedness with
respect to an issue in the lawsuit, then the law of disqualification of
judges ought to supply a remedy. That might well require a change, at
least of emphasis, in the law of disqualification as it is currently being
enforced in many courts. It seems difficult to understand how a court
that has adopted Section 2C could do otherwise than accept the inference
of lack of impartiality in particular cases that it has accepted at large.
Indeed, the extent to which courts will not recognize the inference in
particular cases tends to lessen the justification for Section 2C as written.
The areas where the inference seems weakest-membership in those
organizations at the margins of the prohibition-the ones with which this
paper has been most concerned, are precisely the organizations most
affected by Section 2C. If, however, "invidious" or "stigmatizing"
discrimination is a central reason for the organization's existence, then
the inference of partiality on the party of a judge who is a member seems
strong, and a motion for disqualification ought to be granted.
If a motion for disqualification of a judge based on membership in
such an organization is granted, that leaves the symbolic effect on the
judiciary as the only reason for the categorical prohibition contained in
Section 2C. As noted previously, this symbolic effect, while important,
is no different for judges than for other high government officials, and if
it is to be recognized at all, it should be recognized in legislation that
applies across the board to all such officials.
To summarize-my personal preference is to adopt Alternative 5
because the ambiguities, the chilling effect, and the constitutional
implications of Section 2C are combined with an inadequate interpretive
process. I would deal with the matters Section 2C addresses through the
law of disqualification and through general legislation. I might add a
disclosure option to this alternative if the definitional problems were
satisfactorily resolved. Alternative 5 also eliminates constitutional
problems, except to the extent that general legislation may raise them.
Alternative 5 is perhaps best understood as an argument for not having
adopted Section 2C in the first place. Once adopted, it may be
impossible for political and symbolic reasons to repeal that Section. If
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that is the case, then any of the other solutions is, in my view, less
problematic than retaining Section 2C in its current formulation. At the
very least, Alternative 1, which would amend the Commentary to
address the unresolved issues, needs to be adopted.
The attacks on various rules governing the practice of law and
various rules governing the practice of judging stem from somewhat
different impulses, but they also share certain characteristics. Among the
latter are the use of the powerful, blunt weapon of the First Amendment
to "demystify" both lawyering and judging. The Introduction to this
paper summarized the use of the First Amendment to remove many of
the special rules governing lawyers' practice of law-rules that had been
seen as necessary to preserve the fiduciary, noncommercial aspects of
law practice. To the extent that the per se membership restrictions of
Sections 2C and 2A represent a part of the vision of the judiciary as
something separate and apart from the rest of the political structure, a
successful First Amendment attack on them would advance beyond
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and open the way to attack yet
other provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which have been
justified as necessary to preserve the symbolic and actual
impartiality
51
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Whether the attempt to alter what has been a long-held view about
the importance of impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in the
conduct of judges will be successful remains to be seen. The use of the
First Amendment to cut back on the lawyers' rules came in a period of
expansion of the constitutional weapons of the judiciary into large areas
of the social and political life of the country where they had not
theretofore been used. In so doing, the judiciary made it clear, in ways
that had not been apparent to special interest groups before, that the
judiciary was a place where the social, economic, and political struggle
was being played out. Judges therefore came to be seen as much more
important players in all aspects of the life of the country than previously.
It is not surprising therefore that the judicial selection process, whether
by appointment or by election, should become even more of a political
event than it had been. But it is also not surprising that efforts should
151. See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding unconstitutional
Georgia's prohibition of personal solicitation of campaign funds and its broad prohibition of
misleading and deceptive statements during a campaign); Spargo v. New York State Commission
on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding unconstitutional provisions of
the New York Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting political activity and those aimed at preserving
impartiality and the appearance of impartiality), vacated and remanded with directions to abstain
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 351 F.3d 65 (2003), cert. denied, 124 Sup. Ct. 2812 (2004).
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then be made to treat judges more like the other political actors than
before. The task of judges is different from the task of other political
actors, but to the extent that judges, through their substantive decisions
and extrajudicial activities, edge themselves away from that notion, then
to that extent the justification for special rules that limit judges'
activities in ways that the activities of other political actors are not
limited is diminished.
There is a tension between the judges' regulatory antidiscrimination impulse that has led them to impose Section 2C in its
various forms on themselves and the free-swinging use of the First
Amendment that could only have been used in the aftermath of the
expansion of judicial constitutional power beginning in the second half
of the twentieth century. Judicial correctness has come up against
constitutional correctness.
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